The first tanker carrying Russian diesel to the United States since 2022 is expected to arrive in New York within the next few weeks, but its 40,000-ton cargo amounts to less than two hours of American consumption. The shipment will barely register at the pump—and it answers the wrong question, since what drove American diesel past $6 a gallon was never a shortage of Russian supply, but historic bottlenecks from the war in the Middle East.

Recall what happened between May and July of this year, when Ukraine launched one of the most destructive phases of its energy war against Moscow, sending waves of drones attacking massive Russian refineries at Kirishi, Ryazan, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, and Omsk one after another. If Russian refining capacity governed American fuel costs, prices at U.S. truck stops should have exploded. Instead, American diesel fell by $1.06 a gallon.

With the midterms days away and September’s consumer price index showing fuel oil up a staggering 74% on the year, President Donald Trump has cast Kyiv as the architect of American inflation. “What’s happened in Russia with Ukraine has been really the biggest problem for diesel,” he said in the Oval Office on September 30 before naming Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy the culprit, telling reporters that Zelenskyy “wants to make problems for our farmers, our ranchers, with diesel fuel.”

The charge is politically convenient but economically backward. Until this month’s waiver, Russian fuel had been barred from American ports since 2022, meaning Ukrainian strikes have reached U.S. pumps only through the gradual tightening of global supply. The real shockwave runs through the Strait of Hormuz, where Tehran can choke off a fifth of the world’s seaborne crude overnight. Diesel was $3.48 a gallon in January and still under $4 the week American and Israeli bombs fell on Iran. When Tehran closed the Strait, the price jumped 96 cents in a single week. 

From that moment, the U.S. price line has moved in lockstep with the Iran war—cresting at the April ceasefire, dipping only after the June truce, climbing after the pause in hostilities collapsed in July. By September, the tanker war had driven diesel to a record $6.53. 

Ukraine’s unceasing drone campaign has at most modestly nudged up the global floor, while the Iran war has steered every spike and plunge.

By authorizing the sale of Russian diesel, Washington provided Moscow the relief that sanctions are meant to withhold. And when Zelenskyy refused to halt strikes on Russian refineries, Americans throttled the Starlink defenses only they can supply. 

Now, Ukraine and its European backers are left with a narrowing set of options. Pulled with discipline, however, the levers they hold can still keep Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on a tightening clock.

A cure that feeds the disease

After an Oct. 9 phone call with Putin, President Trump directed the Treasury to reopen American ports to Russian diesel through April 2027. On paper, the deal promises 4.8 million tons of fuel. In reality, the promise amounts to roughly 10 days of U.S. demand, and analysts doubt that Moscow can ship even that much after months of Ukrainian strikes on the refineries that would fill the tankers.

Carnegie’s Sergey Vakulenko calls the arrangement “largely for show,” yet for a Kremlin watching its September oil and gas tax revenues plunge 22% year-over-year, the spectacle is the prize. What former U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul condemned as “absolutely deplorable,” and Zelenskyy called “a gift to Putin,” was followed a week later by a concession of far greater strategic weight. Two days before the Russia provisions of the Graham sanctions act were scheduled to bite, an executive order waived them. In a single stroke, the White House neutralized both the 100 and 500% tariffs and stripped out the clause locking existing sanctions in place.

While Moscow collected waivers, Kyiv got the vise. Washington announced an “energy ceasefire” the Kremlin never bothered to acknowledge. After Zelenskyy held his fire for three days, Russia pounded Ukrainian energy infrastructure 76 times in the week that followed. By the Ukrainian president’s account—one Secretary of State Marco Rubio denies—the American satellite alerts that warn Ukraine when a Russian missile is in the air went dark for a period of time. Procurement contracts required for the transfer of an allied-funded batch of Patriot interceptors reportedly sat unsigned on the desk of U.S. Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth.

Meanwhile, the speed of Starshield datalinks, the military-grade Starlink network that Ukraine’s drone units rely on, was throttled. Starshield datalinks need to operate at speeds up to 550 km/h (342 mph) to effectively intercept Russian jet-powered Shahed and Geran drones. 

The 160 km/h (100 mph) cap was apparently instituted—simply insufficient to protect Ukrainian civilians from Russian ballistic missiles. 

Trump and Elon Musk finger-pointed at each other for the restriction. Trump has reportedly since called Musk to lift the cap. U.S. officials say service is running more normally. Kyiv says the limit remained in place into this weekend, with President Zelenskyy tweeting on October 24 that service has now been restored.

The Trump Administration should also allow Ukraine to use the system in Russia, targeting ballistic missile launchers. Take out the archer, not the arrows.

What Ukraine can still do

Washington’s squeeze rests on the premise that Kyiv is losing and must be forced to settle, but the front-line situation does not support that notion. Russian forces have made virtually no net territorial gains in 2026 despite suffering more than 40,000 casualties a month since July. At this year’s rate of advance, we estimate that Moscow would need 60 years to capture the rest of Donetsk Oblast.

In fact, the momentum has tilted the other way, with Ukrainian counteroffensives, such as the exceptionally innovative Operation Vivaldi. For months, Kyiv’s forces have killed or seriously wounded more Russian soldiers than the Kremlin can recruit. Closing that gap would require a mass mobilization Putin has been afraid to order, wary of unrest in a country reeling from the fuel shortages created by Ukraine’s refinery strikes. The myth of an inevitable Russian victory amounts to a Kremlin sales pitch aimed at Washington, and the very energy campaign the White House wants to shut down is what keeps Putin boxed in.

Nor can the White House physically switch that campaign off. For all the damage the administration’s freeze inflicted on Ukraine’s air shield, enough Ukrainian drones and missiles were able to reach their targets. Washington’s leverage is entirely defensive, whereas Ukraine’s offensive reach is built at home and in Europe. The 1,000-strong armada that struck St. Petersburg in mid-October was built around FP-1 drones, 90% of which are Ukrainian-made, flying into Russian airspace where Starlink does not function, and Starshield caps do not apply. The E.U.’s Kaja Kallas has rightly defended Ukraine’s actions as legitimate self-defense. 

By Putin’s estimate, the wider Ukrainian campaign has cost Russia about 1% of GDP, more than a year of Russian growth, as the central bank’s fight against punishing inflation pushed interest rates to their highest level since the early 2000s. The true toll is almost certainly worse. As we have previously argued, even after Moscow blacked out mandatory economic data, the IMF continues to recycle unverified Kremlin figures to dub Russia the world’s fourth-largest economy at peak output, despite ranking just 51st in GDP per capita. 

In 2022, hundreds of billions of dollars abandoned the Russian economy after our team helped spur the withdrawal of more than 1,000 major corporations following the invasion. Firms that curtailed operations outperformed those that did not, in terms of market performance. 

Even where Kyiv chooses to look beyond oil, its domestic weapons require no American permission and offend no American farmer. Homegrown Long Neptune missiles have already crippled four of the Black Sea Fleet’s Kalibr missile carriers and recently destroyed four Russian Su-34 bombers, proving that Ukraine can systematically hunt the launchers, airfields, and factories that fire on its cities. The same freedom of action applies to striking Russian data centers, an asymmetric campaign that an analyst at the Royal United Services Institute judges lopsidedly in Kyiv’s favor because Ukraine’s critical data is already safely hosted abroad.

Holding an offensive campaign that Washington wants to stop but cannot physically block changes the terms of diplomacy. Toward the White House, Kyiv should act as a customer rather than a supplicant. Any pause in energy strikes should be treated strictly as an opportunity to make a deal—offered only in exchange for verified Russian reciprocity and binding, written guarantees from Washington on Patriot interceptors, satellite-based missile launch warnings, and uncapped Starshield access, a bargain of the kind legislators like Senator Roger Wicker and organizations like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies have urged.

What Europe must now do

Kyiv’s balancing act rests on a hard truth in Brussels. Europe can replace most of America’s financial support and much of its weaponry within two years, but it cannot replace Patriot-class interceptors, space-based ballistic-missile warning, or Starlink-scale connectivity this winter. The vulnerability is partly of Europe’s own making after three decades of over-reliance on American dominance, and it now collides with an American arsenal running dry.

The on-again, off-again war with Iran that drove U.S. diesel to $6.53 is also the conflict that emptied the Pentagon’s magazines. According to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Gulf conflict consumed roughly two-thirds of America’s Patriot inventory and more than a third of its THAAD interceptors, leaving a rebuild measured in years at the exact moment Ukraine’s Patriot stockpiles are reportedly exhausted. Europe’s scramble to build sovereign air defenses—four SAMP/T NG batteries currently on order, a 10-nation FREYJA program aiming for a first intercept in mid-2027, and the diplomatic courtship of Japan, the sole non-American producer of PAC-3 interceptors—is real and necessary, but slow. Every euro spent on European interceptors is one less dollar earned in Washington, and one fewer armament President Trump can delay.

A similar bottleneck applies to space. While Europe’s radar and optical satellites could potentially replace American targeting imagery within weeks, OneWeb and the E.U.’s GovSatcom offer only a partial hedge against a Starlink slowdown. And a European satellite constellation capable of warning of a ballistic launch probably will not exist before the 2030s.

Because Europe cannot buy its way out of those technical bottlenecks overnight, it must lean aggressively into the financial and maritime levers it controls today. The E.U.’s €90 billion loan covers 2026 and much of 2027, and when the remaining €70 billion gap comes to a head at the December European Council, moving the €202 billion in frozen Russian assets out of Belgium offers the clearest route around Belgium’s objections. Better still, a full ban on shipping services for Russian crude, along with expanding the shadow-fleet boardings that European navies have already begun, could squeeze Moscow’s war chest at almost no cost to European taxpayers.

Ukraine’s most decisive advantage, though, is found on the factory floor. Domestic drone production has surged 370% this year, and the Ukrainian-made Flamingo cruise missile costs just under $600,000, less than a fifth of an American Tomahawk’s $3.5 million price tag. By guaranteeing a loan to the Flamingo’s manufacturer, Denmark has laid out a blueprint for surviving an erratic Washington: European capital behind Ukrainian weapons.

The lesson of the lever

A bitter paradox governs the current battlefield. The offensive campaign squeezing Moscow is the one Washington objects to, while the defenses faltering over Ukrainian cities are the ones only the U.S. can supply. By blaming Kyiv for an energy shock originating in the Persian Gulf, the White House has struck a bargain that lowers no prices at home, replenishes the aggressor’s coffers abroad, and teaches the Kremlin that American sanctions expire if Putin simply waits them out. Such a posture delivers neither peace nor strength. 

Ukraine is akin to the Biblical hero David, who, through cunning, triumphed over the lumbering giant Goliath. Moscow's “card hand” is neither the colossus Trump believes it to be nor the colossus its propaganda advertises. Russia is not remotely an economic superpower. Beneath its vast map lies a concentrated population—over 80% of the population lives in the 20% not plagued by extreme cold, permafrost, and poor soil—and a brittle economy dependent on raw materials the world can increasingly buy elsewhere, backed by a military with a long history of failing to subdue smaller, more determined foes, from Japan in 1905 and Poland in 1920 to Finland in 1940 and the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s. Sheer land mass has never guaranteed victory when the smaller side is fighting for its existence.

The silver lining is that Washington’s attempted coercion is forging the European autonomy it assumed would never materialize. If European leaders withstand Russian pressure over the next 18 months and resist the political disarray stoked by Kremlin disinformation, the continent will emerge a far more formidable power—proving the quip circulating in allied capitals that Europe has found no better unifier since Charlemagne than Donald Trump. Europe, Ukraine, and the world now know what an American guarantee is worth when the guarantor changes its mind, and Washington is about to learn that leverage, like interceptors, is a stock that depletes with every use.

As Mark Twain advised, “It’s not the size of the dog in the fight; it’s the size of the fight in the dog.”

The next time someone does you a favor, take a minute to note how they respond to “thank you.” You’ll likely find that the traditional “you’re welcome” is fast fading and being replaced by “no problem” or “no worries.”

We often treat politeness as a set of rules that people either follow or ignore. But the rules themselves are changing.

In the time of Old English (5^th to 11^th centuries), acting according to one’s rank and station was simply expected. Linguistic analysis shows very direct request forms, for example, “Thou shalt do X,” rather than the more modern, “Would you mind doing X?” And routine thanking, or saying “you’re welcome,” would have seemed odd in a time when people simply did what was required.

When Norman French started to enter English around 1066, the idea of courteous behavior also entered the language. An example would be the move toward switching between “you” and “thou” to appropriately show respect or intimacy, modeled on the French tu/vous distinction.

This concept of courtesy was central to how one expressed gratitude and, by the time we arrived in the early modern era (the time of Shakespeare), thanking was firmly established. However, routinely responding to those thanks was not common. If uttered at all, we’d more often hear something like a deferential, “I am but your humble servant.”

In the 18^th century, elaborate complimenting routines became popular, and by the late 19th and early 20th century, English-speaking society had a greater focus on treating all people as equals. As a result, being aware of how one’s actions might impose upon others became increasingly important.

Requests that were once directly stated as imperatives were now couched with indirectness as merely suggestions or questions: “Shut the window,” became “Could you please shut the window?” And, in addition to saying “thanks,” responding with an acknowledgment of that thanks, such as “you’re welcome,” became routine.

This brings us to modern times. Today, “you’re welcome” is becoming less common. Instead, when someone says “thank you,” we reply with “not at all,” “no problem,” or “no worries.” This assures the person who expresses gratitude that no imposition was involved. In this way, we attempt to offset any social imbalance.  

As a result, Americans who say “no problem” and those who always respond with “you’re welcome” can tend to believe the other camp sounds rude. 

Those who prefer “no problem” often feel that “you’re welcome” has a condescending tone, while “you’re welcome” traditionalists feel like “no problem” suggests the favor could have been a problem. For instance, the sense that “you’re welcome” can have a bit of a smug, haughty tone has been played up by comedians like Will Ferrell in his 2009 Broadway show, You’re Welcome America, satirizing George W. Bush’s presidency.

Research confirms this shift toward expressions like “no problem” or “no worries” over “you’re welcome” is a generational one. In the norms of how we respond to thank you across generations, linguist Aaron Dinkin found that young Americans increasingly preferred “no problem” as the go-to polite response to “thank you.” Older speakers still felt “you’re welcome” was more appropriate, particularly when a favor required more than perfunctory gratitude.

So, the way someone responds to “thank you” is much more than a simple return on someone’s gratitude. These small words help us understand how politeness—and our expectations of one another—have changed over time.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been re-elected to a historic fourth term as Brazil’s President after a tight race with far-right opponent, Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former President and Donald Trump ally Jair Bolsonaro.

Lula won with 51.8% of the vote to Bolsonaro’s 48.2%, Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court announced. Sunday’s vote was a rematch after neither reached an outright majority in the first round on Oct. 4. Lula had trailed then, becoming now the first presidential candidate since Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985 to finish second in the initial vote and win the run-off.

The election also marks a remarkable win for the global left, as it bucks a trend of right-wing electoral victories across Latin America. Lula will serve for another four-year term beginning on Jan. 5, 2027.

“I want to thank the generosity of the Brazilian youth who took to the streets, who went to the streets to defend democracy,” Lula said in his victory speech on Sunday night. “I want to thank the elderly. I saw scenes today of people being carried by their grandchildren to vote, people unable to move around, people with cancer and other illnesses. And people went to vote because we managed to convince them that voting was very important to ensure democracy in the country.”

“This election was a defeat for denialism, a defeat for lies,” he continued.

Bolsonaro, however, said late on Sunday that he would not concede defeat to Lula and would seek an annulment of the result. The senator for Rio de Janeiro said a ruling by the Supreme Court to extend voting for two hours, citing public transport issues, was “unacceptable.”

Nevertheless, several liberal leaders around the world have already lauded the result.

“Long live democracy, the people of Brazil won,” Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney posted, “The relationship between Canada and Brazil has flourished under our partnership. Let’s seize this opportunity to make it even stronger, together — to create major new trade opportunities, protect ​the environment, and build greater prosperity for both our peoples.”

Several U.S. lawmakers have also congratulated Lula on the result, including Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, Rep. Ro Khanna (D, Calif.), California Gov. Gavin Newsom, and New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani.

A former metalworker and union leader, Lula co-founded the Workers’ Party in 1980 and continues to serve as its honorary president. He served as Brazil’s President between 2003 to 2011, before he was jailed from 2018 to 2019 on corruption convictions that were later annulled. He went on to defeat incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro in 2022, winning his third presidential term.

Lula’s campaign focused on labor reform, welfare benefits, and affordability. At a time when public debt as a share of GDP has risen to its highest level since the pandemic, Lula cited his achievements in lowering poverty rates, as well as reducing unemployment, illiteracy, and deforestation to record lows. He pledged to make public transit free on the weekends, a program that would need congressional approval. He also increased benefits under his signature Bolsa Família program and championed a landmark constitutional amendment shortening the working week, which Congress approved.

Bolsonaro, meanwhile, campaigned on harsher criminal penalties, tougher policing, lower taxes, and cuts to government spending. His campaign highlighted a corruption investigation involving Lula’s son and a pension fraud scandal that spanned both Lula’s and Jair Bolsonaro’s administrations.

Bolsonaro also called for amnesty for his father, Jair Bolsonaro, who is serving a 27-year prison sentence under house arrest after being found guilty of plotting a coup to overturn his defeat in the 2022 election.

In his election night speech, Lula pledged to strengthen federal involvement in public security, expand education and healthcare, and develop Brazil’s technological and artificial intelligence industries.

“This country will not be built by me,” he said. “But by you.”

A blow to the right

Lula’s win pumps the brakes on the broader political shift towards the right in Latin America. Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica, and Chile elected right-wing presidents in recent election cycles, reversing an earlier “pink tide” of left-wing governments.

Lula’s victory also denies Trump another political ally in Latin America, which include Argentinian President Javier Milei and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele.

Bolsonaro had portrayed himself as an ally of Trump, courting closer ties with Washington and backing U.S. terrorist designations for Brazil’s major criminal gangs. Reuters reported on Saturday, citing current and former U.S. officials, that two U.S. State Department officials had pushed sanctions and other measures intended to weaken Lula and help return the Bolsonaros to power. The State Department did not comment specifically on the reported efforts but told Reuters that “all actions taken by the United ⁠States against narco-traffickers and to protect free speech are to defend the rights and lives of the American people. The Brazilian people have the right to choose their leaders through free and fair elections.”

Trump previously expressed support for Jair Bolsonaro and labelled Lula a “radical left lunatic” during Brazil’s 2022 presidential election. He also criticized the criminal prosecution of Bolsonaro, calling it a “witch hunt” and demanding it end.

Trump has not reacted to the election results as of early Monday. After Bolsonaro led in the first round on Oct. 4, Trump called the result “close, but a very, very big victory.” His son, Donald Trump Jr., posted earlier criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision to extend voting hours and what he described as the lack of American mainstream media coverage of it.

Lula had warned that Bolsonaro would surrender Brazil’s sovereignty to Trump.

Lula has publicly sparred with Trump on multiple occasions. He accused the Trump Administration of interfering in Brazil’s election and imposing punitive tariffs on Brazil under alleged pressure from the Bolsonaros. The Bolsonaro family and the U.S. State Department denied the allegations.

At the same time, Lula has pursued closer ties with China, Brazil’s largest trading partner and the U.S.’s geopolitical rival, although he rejected subordination and said Brazil was not choosing between the two countries.

“This country will not accept being anyone’s backyard,” Lula said on Sunday night.

Analysts, however, warned that Lula’s political influence could wane despite his re-election. Earlier this month, Brazil elected its most conservative National Congress since the 1980s. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) and allied parties could control majorities in both chambers, with more than 280 of 513 seats in the lower house and up to 50 of 81 seats in the Senate.

That could make it difficult for Lula to pass his legislative agenda, analysts said.

But Lula shrugged off those concerns and promised to work with the more conservative Congress to govern for all Brazilians.

“The day after tomorrow, the 27th, I turn 81 years old, and I want to make a commitment in front of the press and in front of you,” Lula said. “I will have the best term a President has ever had in the history of this country”

In 2015, Chicago’s public health department identified three cases of invasive meningococcal disease, a highly dangerous pathogen that can kill within hours. To determine whether these cases signaled a larger outbreak, the department—which one of us, Dr. Julie Morita, led at the time—needed to know not just total cases, but the total population and demographics of affected areas. The team turned to a pillar of our nation’s public health system: the U.S. Census.

The data showed that men who have sex with men—including gay and bisexual men—among the city’s Black population were disproportionately affected. That finding drove the health department’s response, which included working with community partners to surge thousands of free vaccines into neighborhoods across Chicago. Instead of a larger and far deadlier outbreak, the outbreak ended with 11 cases in Chicago and one death.  

Census data informs every aspect of our nation’s public health system. As former leaders of local and federal health agencies, we have seen this firsthand. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has proposed radical changes to the census that would make our country less healthy, less safe, and less fair. 

The public comment period on this proposal closes on Nov. 2. Health leaders must move quickly to oppose these deeply misguided changes. It is clear to us that these changes would amount not only to an assault on our public health system but also on the U.S. Constitution. 

Per the Constitution, the federal government has carried out a national census every decade since 1790—through wars, depressions, and pandemics. Everyone who resides in our country matters and should be counted. But the Trump Administration is suggesting that the census should intentionally exclude people. This includes undocumented residents and nonimmigrant visa holders, such as foreign national students and temporary workers whose visas may permit them to live in the U.S. for several years. The Administration is further attempting to remove demographic questions related to race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation from the census questionnaire.      

The repercussions would be vast. An inaccurate count would negatively affect congressional representation. The idea that some people do not deserve to be counted uncomfortably echoes the “3/5 compromise,” an insidious and later repealed clause in the original Constitution under which enslaved persons were counted as less than full people. Incomplete and unreliable demographic data could distort how trillions of federal dollars are distributed across hundreds of programs such as Medicaid, SNAP, WIC, and Head Start. Communities with the greatest needs, especially those with immigrant or mixed-status families, would likely be hardest hit. 

These are our neighbors, families, and friends. But let’s be clear: the impacts would extend beyond those communities, especially the public health consequences. As the Chicago meningococcal outbreak illustrates, health officials need a complete picture to protect people from disease and other threats. They must know who is getting sick, where, and at what rate. Take any of those data out of the equation, and the people who need the most help are far less likely to get it.  

During the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009, when one of us, Dr. Richard Besser, served as acting director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), census data were instrumental in tracking the outbreak. CDC relied on this data to calculate infection rates by age, which showed that children and young adults were getting sick at far higher rates than older adults—a striking departure from typical patterns observed with seasonal flu. When a vaccine became available, these data directly informed recommendations that prioritized children and young adults. 

A decade later, the COVID pandemic demonstrated the importance of these data on a massive scale. As case counts surged in the initial months of the outbreak, population and demographic data revealed who was shouldering the greatest burdens. CDC found that hospitalization rates were highest for American Indian, Alaska Native, Black, and Hispanic populations. CDC later used census population estimates to calculate vaccination rates by race and ethnicity, allowing health officials to identify disparities in vaccine uptake. States like North Carolina relied successfully on census-tract data to increase vaccination rates among target populations.   

These examples span different locations, diseases, and levels of government, but illustrate common themes: public health officials rely heavily on census data to save lives and protect communities, and protecting communities at greatest risk helps keep us all safer and healthier. 

Health officials use population counts to study cancer, heart disease, HIV/AIDS, and many other diseases. Demographic data expose disparities that raw numbers can obscure and show whether those gaps are growing or shrinking. Together, they offer a roadmap to direct resources where they can do the most good.  

The next census count is still a few years away, but what our leaders decide now matters a great deal. A census that deliberately counts fewer people while telling us less about them will leave our nation ill-prepared for future outbreaks and pandemics, while making it harder to handle daily health challenges. It is essential for the public health community to speak out now.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) last week filed a lawsuit that intends to weigh in on the results of the Senate race in Alaska. It seeks to block certification of the election results under certain conditions if Republican Sen. Dan S. Sullivan loses. 

Experts question whether it has the legal basis to do so—and if this intervention is a preview of how the Trump Administration might respond to unfavorable midterm results across the U.S.

The DOJ, in its Oct. 22 filing, expressed concern that there might be “voter confusion” stemming from the fact that two candidates on the ballot are named Dan Sullivan. Republican Sen. Dan S. Sullivan is currently seeking re-election, and one of his challengers is Daniel J. Sullivan Jr. (a Republican whose party affiliation does not appear beside his name on the general-election ballot).

The GOP first raised concerns in May, prompting a proposal to add “incumbent” beside the sitting senator’s name on the ballot. But the party continued to warn that voters could split their votes between the two Sullivans, opening the door for Democrat Mary Peltola.

Read More: The 7 Key Governor Races to Watch in the Midterm Elections

Alaska has traditionally been a state that leans Republican: Trump won the state by 13 points in 2024, and the state has not had a Democratic governor since 2002. 

But the race is closer than analysts first expected. October polls from The New York Times/Siena, Alaska Survey Research, and Data for Progress show Peltola leading Dan S. Sullivan by between 2 and 7 points.

The DOJ lawsuit claims that the “sole purpose” of Daniel J. Sullivan’s candidacy is to benefit Peltola. Therefore, it seeks to block certification if the incumbent loses but would have won with all of Daniel J. Sullivan’s votes. To determine that, it proposes recalculating the ranked-choice count as though those votes had gone to the incumbent instead.

Under Alaska’s ranked-choice system, voters rank candidates by preference. If no candidate initially wins a majority, the lowest-ranking candidates are eliminated in successive rounds and their ballots transfer to the next remaining choice.

In a Truth Social post on Oct. 21, Trump said he was “very concerned” about the race and described the situation as “totally confusing.”

“Even 1, 2, or 3% could make the difference,” he wrote of the potential outcomes.

The DOJ said there would need to be an “investigation” to determine which vote was meant for which Sullivan. The DOJ said an “investigation” would be needed to determine which Sullivan voters intended to support. 

Attorney General Todd Blanche suggested on CNN’s State of the Union on Sunday that voters’ rankings could provide clues: “There are a number of scenarios where it could be obvious that a voter was confused by the way they wrote down candidates.” He did not elaborate on what those scenarios might look like within the parameters of a formal investigation. 

Neither the DOJ nor the candidates’ campaigns responded to TIME’s requests for comment.

On Oct. 23, Peltola’s campaign and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee asked to join the DOJ’s case as defendants, writing: “Alaskans, apparently, must elect Senator Dan S. Sullivan or the President will not let them elect anyone at all.”

On Sunday, Peltola’s campaign and the DSCC asked the court for permission to seek dismissal and requested an expedited ruling this week. They proposed requiring a DOJ response by Tuesday afternoon, arguing that the pending lawsuit could undermine confidence in the election.

Voting rights experts are calling it a “garbage lawsuit” and “an unprecedented intervention by the federal government.” 

Lisa Murkowski, the state’s other Republican Senator who is not up for re-election, endorsed the incumbent Sullivan in January. Last week, however, she condemned the DOJ’s efforts to intervene.

“Alaskans don’t need any help voting for their preferred candidates,” she wrote Oct. 23 in a post on X. “The Department of Justice should never have filed this lawsuit.”

Trump responded to her comments with a scathing post on Truth Social on Oct. 24, calling Murkowski “Republicans’ Worst Senator, by far” and “a DISGRACE to Alaska and our country.”

He also criticized the state’s ranked-choice voting system, writing: “Ranked Choice Voting Ballot is a TOTAL DEMOCRAT SCAM meant to confuse the Voter.”

Asked to comment on the DOJ filing the next day, Trump told reporters: "I'm the one that said do it." 

Blanche declined to confirm whether the Justice Department acted at the behest of the President during his appearance on CNN on Sunday. 

He denied that the Trump Administration was laying the groundwork to overturn election results, arguing that the lawsuit would allow Alaska officials and courts to address any unlawful voter confusion after the election.

“It is an obligation of the states to avoid confusion, among other things, confusion in the minds of voters in the election process,” he said. “So the question is whether Alaska, by allowing this to happen, is violating the law and the federal law and the constitution by allowing confusion in the ballot.”  

Why experts question the DOJ’s Alaska election lawsuit

Prior to the DOJ lawsuit, Republicans sought to remove Daniel J. Sullivan from the ballot in June. 

When he decided to run, Republicans sent complaints to Carol Beecher, the director of Alaska’s Division of Elections. She wrote a letter to Sullivan in June saying that election officials had determined that he would be removed, claiming his candidacy was not filed “in good faith for the purpose of genuinely pursuing” leadership. 

Sullivan challenged the decision and sued the state. Judge Thomas Matthews of Alaska’s Third District Superior Court ruled in June that he could remain on the ballot beside the other candidates. He wrote in a 32-page decision that elections officials were introducing a “new, previously unstated ‘good faith’ criteria” and said that this requirement is not present in state law or the Constitution. 

That decision was upheld by the Alaska Supreme Court on June 29.

It was later determined that a “mitigating remedy” would be to present each candidate’s name with the middle initial and to add “incumbent” to the sitting senator’s name. 

The Alaska Supreme Court ruling did not end scrutiny of Daniel J. Sullivan’s candidacy. In August, Reuters reported that the DOJ had issued grand jury subpoenas while investigating whether he entered the race to confuse voters.

The DOJ then filed its new lawsuit amid October polling that showed Peltola ahead.

The department justifies the move using language in the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) that says its purpose is to “protect the integrity of the electoral process.” 

Experts, however, dispute whether that language authorizes the intervention.

Derek Muller, a professor of election law at the University of Notre Dame, wrote in a blog post after the filing that the proposed investigation is “essentially impossible.” But succeeding is not the point, he continues. 

“The legal claim is so absurdly thin, there’s essentially no likelihood of success,” he wrote, adding that the real purpose of litigation is to signal to the press and public that the Trump Administration is “ready” if the result goes against the GOP’s interests in Alaska.

The Center for Election Innovation and Research (CEIR), a nonpartisan nonprofit working to inform voters, called the move “unprecedented” in a statement that also said the lawsuit “raises serious concerns about political interference.”

“I cannot recall an administration ever attempting to stop the certification of an election—and certainly not 11 days before polls close,” CEIR Executive Director David Becker said in the statement. 

“Furthermore, this issue has already been fully litigated by Alaska’s courts,” he continued. “Alaska election officials are following state law, as the Constitution requires, and the courts will uphold that.”

Richard Hasen, a professor of law at UCLA, called the move a “desperate and unprofessional assault” on the American elections system.

Common Cause, a nonpartisan organization represented by the ACLU, filed a motion on Oct. 23 seeking to join the case to oppose the DOJ’s effort. Its president and CEO, Virginia Kase Solomon, said in a statement Oct. 24: “Politicians don’t dictate election outcomes; the people do.”

Nate Adams, a spokesperson for Dan S. Sullivan’s campaign, expressed confidence in his candidate’s re-election but told local media outlet KFSK last week: “We’ll let the DOJ complaint run its course.”

How has the federal government used the National Voter Registration Act?

The National Voter Registration Act was enacted in 1993 to address barriers to voter registration that depressed participation and disproportionately affected racial minorities. It was predicated upon the fundamental right of every eligible citizen to vote, as well as the duty of local and federal governments to protect that participation in the democratic process.

In the past 30-plus years, it has been used to sue states that fail to maintain their voter rolls or enforce registration requirements.

The Biden Administration also reckoned with Alaska in 2022, finding that the state wasn’t consistently letting residents register to vote—or update their voter registration—as part of their routine paperwork at the Department of Motor Vehicles. An agreement reached that June required Alaska to bring those procedures into compliance with the NVRA.

In 2012, the Obama Administration sued the state of Florida over a program intended to identify and remove suspected noncitizens from its voter-registration rolls too close to the elections. The parties agreed to dismiss the case in January 2013. 

The George W. Bush Administration also sued several states under the NVRA to enforce requirements for offering voter registration and maintaining accurate voter rolls. 

The DOJ’s Alaska lawsuit goes further than those earlier cases. Experts say the NVRA does not expressly authorize blocking election certification over suspected voter confusion.

If courts accept the DOJ’s argument, the consequences could extend beyond Alaska, warns Walter Olson, a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute. It could give the federal government a new basis to challenge how states design ballots, determine which candidates qualify, and certify election results—all in the name of protecting election integrity.

“[The lawsuit] attempts to stretch a federal statute, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), beyond recognition by snipping language from the law’s preamble and treating it as if it creates vast and open-ended new duties that the federal government can enforce on states,” Olson said in a statement Oct. 23. “If accepted, it would suddenly federalize many issues of local election administration.”