On most fronts, President Donald Trump has shown little concern for reducing Americans’ cost of living ahead of November’s midterms. 

Trump has refused to accept Iran’s ceasefire proposals, even as the conflict pushes fuel costs to new heights. And he’s declined to abandon his trade wars — with US adversaries and allies alike — even as tariffs nudge up Americans’ expenses. 

Yet there is one area where Trump has recently tried to lower consumer prices in an economically coherent way, and it’s been a political disaster.

In late August, the president lowered tariffs on up to 661 million pounds of imported lean beef trimmings, a key ingredient in hamburger meat.

This policy directly addressed a genuine problem facing US consumers: Ground beef prices were roughly 8 percent higher last month than they had been one year earlier. And unlike many of the White House’s other ideas for increasing affordability, the meat imports proposal comported with conventional economic logic: If you reduce input costs for meat processors, they’ll be able to sell beef at lower prices. 

By endorsing this reasoning, the Trump administration was implicitly rebuking its own theory of trade economics (which holds that tariffs increase costs for foreign companies, not American consumers). In doing so, Trump also put voters’ material interests — and economists’ conventional wisdom — above his ideological hangups.

And he’s paying dearly for it. 

Instead of appeasing cash-strapped shoppers, the beef imports policy has mostly just aggravated (already aggrieved) agricultural firms. All across the farm belt, cattle ranchers are incensed by Trump aiding their foreign competition — after the president had already depressed their sales through tariffs and increased their costs via his Iran war and immigration policies. 

Cowpokes aren’t alone in resenting the White House’s affronts to agricultural interests. In dark red states like Kansas and Iowa, Democratic candidates have become highly competitive, while Republicans are racing to distance themselves from the president, in part by going after his beef plan directly.

Which raises the question: How and why did Trump’s plan for cheaper hamburgers go so wrong?

The answer partly concerns that measure’s particular flaws. But it also reflects broader problems with the administration’s governance, which now threaten to cost Republicans badly: A persistent failure to account for its policies’ economic consequences, a reliance on symbolic, last-minute fixes instead of far-sighted planning, and inattention to the material concerns of voters — even those as deeply conservative as cattle ranchers.

Trump’s cheap beef policy is small potatoes

As a political matter, the fundamental flaw with Trump’s beef import policy is simple: Its benefits to individual consumers are minuscule while its costs to certain cattle ranchers are substantial.

Trump’s tariff exemption has a tiny impact on consumer prices for two reasons. First, it just doesn’t affect that much meat. Although 661 million pounds may sound like a lot, that adds up to only about 6.8 percent of America’s annual ground beef supply. And most of these imports go to restaurants and fast-food joints, since grocers tend to prefer fresh, domestic ground beef. 

Second, only a small fraction of beef importers’ savings is likely to pass through to consumers. When a meat processor sees the costs of imported beef fall, it will generally try to pocket as much of its savings as it can, perhaps passing a small chunk along to the distributors it contracts with.

The distributors will then try to retain as much of that small chunk as they can before passing a slimmer fraction of the initial savings along to retailers or restaurants, who will then try to do much the same before selling to customers. In this way, past USDA research has suggested that only about 19 percent of any decline in wholesale beef prices reaches consumers.

Combine this reality with the narrow scale of Trump’s tariff relief, and the consumer benefit becomes microscopic. According to the Purdue University economists Ken Foster and Bernhard Dalheimer, Trump’s policy will reduce wholesale ground beef prices by at most 1.41 percent. If only 19 percent of that decline passes through to consumers, as the USDA’s research suggests, then shoppers will pay just 0.27 percent less for ground beef. In other words, in the best-case scenario, Trump’s policy would knock about two cents off the price of a pound of hamburger meat. 

For context, that price has risen by $1.32 cents — or 23 percent — since Trump took office.

Why cattle country is beefing with the White House

Looking at these numbers, one might ask: So what are these ranchers complaining about? If Trump’s policy only lets in enough cheap foreign beef to cut prices by a couple cents, how much could it really hurt domestic cattle producers?

It is true that the president’s tariff relief has not condemned cattle ranchers to penury. But it does hurt farmers more than it helps individual consumers for two reasons.

First, the impact is highly concentrated on certain cattle operations. The new imports soften demand for domestic cull cows — breeding females who’ve gotten old enough to be worth more dead than alive — because their meat tends to be low-fat. No ranch specializes in producing such cattle. But ranchers who happen to have older herds at the moment are more reliant on cull cow sales. 

Second, from the perspective of all ranchers, Trump’s policy sets a disconcerting precedent. To build a herd, ranchers must hold back young female cows today — passing up immediate earnings from selling their meat — so as to breed more future cattle, which won’t come to market for years. 

In effect, this means that ranchers must perennially sink money into bets on the trajectory of future beef prices. If there happens to be a hamburger glut when today’s calves become ripe for slaughter, then their investments could produce a shabby return. But this downside risk is typically offset by the potential for outsize gains: If beef prices soar three years from now, ranchers who rebuild their herds today will reap large profits.

Yet Trump policy threatens this upside: If the government makes a habit of letting in cheap foreign beef every time hamburger prices spike, then it will effectively lower the ceiling on domestic ranchers’ future profits. 

As Iowa Sen. Chuck Grassley, Kansas Sen. Jerry Moran, and dozens of other farm-state members of Congress put the point in a letter to Trump, “Cattle markets are cyclical, and ranchers use the upswings to prepare for the inevitable downturn.” The lawmakers therefore urge Trump to abandon any “intervention in the natural system” that might depress those upswings, so as not to “undermine the long-term viability of family-owned cattle operations throughout the supply chain.”

Trump’s unintentional war on agriculture

For these reasons, Trump’s beef tariff exemption was inevitably going to attract more complaints from ranchers than applause for consumers. What’s made it especially politically toxic, however, is the broader policy context it emerged from. 

Simply put, when your foreign policy costs the average US household more than $500 in excess gasoline expenses — while your tariffs cost them $1,100 in elevated consumer prices — they’re probably not going to thank you for making a pound of ground beef two cents cheaper.

Meanwhile, ranchers may have been a bit less apoplectic about heightened foreign competition if Trump hadn’t already been squeezing them with his broader agenda.

Thanks largely to the president’s trade war with China, American beef exports fell 12 percent in 2025, as Beijing erected retaliatory barriers to US meat. This year, Trump’s trade war with Canada has further cut American farmers’ sales.

And while their foreign markets have been shrinking, US agricultural firms’ expenses have been skyrocketing due to the Iran War.

Farmers in general — and ranchers in particular — rely heavily on diesel fuel to power tractors, trucks, trailers, and myriad other agricultural machines. Thus, as the Iran War has throttled the global energy supply and triggered a record-breaking surge in diesel prices, US farmers have been hammered. 

In July 2026, American farms were paying 22 percent more for fuel than when Trump took office. Over the same period, fertilizer costs have risen by 8 percent, due to the Iran War’s impact on natural gas prices. 

If this weren’t enough cause for farmbelt consternation, Trump’s immigration enforcement surge has provided an additional source of pain. Ranchers, like other farmers, rely heavily on the labor of immigrants, some of whom are undocumented. For this reason, US agricultural businesses have been wary of Trump’s approach to interior enforcement, despite their deeply conservative bent. 

Bizarrely, even as the administration has tried to placate rancher anger in recent weeks, it also launched a series of ICE raids targeted at beef-producing areas. These actions have triggered “work force disruptions” at feed yards and dairies — as immigrant workers were intimidated into staying home — according to a joint statement from the Cattlemen Associations for Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas. The groups allege that thousands of cattle shipments have been delayed as a result, saddling producers with millions in lost revenue and unexpected costs.

Ironically, by engineering these ICE-induced disruptions, the White House also plausibly raised beef prices for consumers, undermining its own politically costly push for hamburger affordability.

Republicans are losing ground in the countryside

The political fallout from Trump’s beef policies — and broader affronts to agricultural interests — has been profound. 

Trump won Kansas in 2024 by more than 16 points. Yet Democratic minister Adam Hamilton is polling just 1.5 points behind sitting Republican Sen. Roger Marshall, according to a RealClearPolitics polling average. 

By itself, this could be chalked up to some peculiar, race-specific factor. But in Iowa, a farm belt state that went for Trump by 13 points in 2024, Democrats are also mounting improbably competitive campaigns. Democratic state representative Josh Turek leads Republican Rep. Ashley Hinson (who is publicly concerned about the beef issue) by half a point in polls of Iowa’s Senate race, while Democratic state lawmaker Lindsay James narrowly leads the House race in Iowa’s Second District, which Trump won by 10 points in 2024.

Meanwhile, in heavily agricultural Nebraska — where Trump beat Kamala Harris by more than 20 points — Democrat-aligned independent Senate candidate Dan Osborn is attacking Trump’s beef imports policy and running neck-and-neck with incumbent Republican Sen. Pete Ricketts. And in the Cornhusker State’s First District, which backed Trump by 13 points two years ago, Democrat Chris Backenmeyer is polling about two points behind the Republican incumbent Mike Flood.

Critically, Democrats’ gains in these jurisdictions don’t merely reflect the nationwide backlash against Trump and his party. The Democratic Party margin over Republicans in the national generic ballot is now about 9 points — a 10.5-point improvement over Harris’s showing in 2024. In the Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska Senate races, Democrats are outperforming Harris’s showing by 13 points or more. 

Now, it’s conceivable that Democrats’ apparent strength in the farm belt could reflect some kind of systematic polling error. For example, if pollsters were undersampling less-educated rural white voters, then that might inflate Democratic candidates’ numbers more in agricultural states than in the country as a whole. 

But Republicans in the farm belt seem to think the rural backlash is real — and driven, at least partly, by Trump’s unintentional assaults on the agricultural sector.

A little bit of free trade goes a short way

Ultimately, the lesson of Trump’s ground beef fiasco isn’t that the president should have just ignored voters’ demands for cheaper meat — or economists’ warnings about tariffs’ negative impacts on affordability.

Had Trump prioritized low prices — and heeded basic economics — from day one, ranchers might still have ended up bitter about facing heightened foreign competition. But in a world without Trump’s trade conflicts or Iran War, such cattle producers would enjoy lower costs and larger foreign markets — and might therefore be more willing to take higher beef imports in stride. 

Meanwhile, if the prices of fuel and consumer goods were broadly lower, shoppers might be more appreciative of Trump’s economic governance. To be sure, even in that scenario, Americans probably wouldn’t notice the impact of loosening constraints on foreign lean beef trimmings. But if the administration were replicating such affordability measures across all policy fronts, the consequent savings could eventually add up to something large enough to attract voters’ notice and approval. 

In our world, however, Trump’s half-hearted embrace of ground-beef globalism was too little, too late. And in November, his party’s farm-belt candidates might pay the price.

To no small extent, Americans have grown accustomed to being watched.

For more than a decade, CCTV cameras have recorded a hefty portion of many people’s public movements, while ubiquitous smartphones have made us all perpetually vulnerable to unsolicited documentation (if not, social media notoriety).

Until recently, however, technical limitations constrained the reach of government surveillance (at least, in the physical realm). Police may have been swimming in CCTV footage. But using such videos to track any given person’s movements was an extremely time-intensive endeavor. To do so, an officer would need to sift through hours of footage captured on many different cameras.

Yet AI is now making it possible for the government to trace ordinary citizens’ movements with unprecedented ease and precision. Or at least, this is what the security firm Flock Safety has effectively promised — and the company’s critics have loudly warned. 

Flock provides police departments with networks of surveillance cameras — primarily, automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) that photograph each vehicle that passes them. 

The firm’s main selling point is also its chief political liability: Its ALPRs log not only license plate numbers, but also generate textual descriptions of all vehicles they detect and store this information in a nationally integrated, searchable database. This makes it technically feasible for police to monitor the travels of most any driver with a few keystrokes. 

Alas, some cops cannot be trusted with that power. In August, the Washington Post reported that at least 50 law enforcement officers had been charged or accused of using license-plate readers for illegitimate purposes, often to stalk their exes or romantic interests. Even more alarmingly, some police departments appear to have used ALPR data to surveil their own critics and protesters. 

These revelations fortified an already growing movement against license plate readers. In August alone, more than 90 cities and counties canceled contracts with Flock. And this backlash has been remarkably bipartisan. Deep blue cities like Los Angeles, Austin, Texas, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, have backed out of partnerships with Flock, while Republicans in Florida have barred local police from installing ALPRs on state highways, and the Texas GOP has paused funding for Flock cameras.

The anti-ALPR movement is responding to real problems with how that technology has been deployed. And yet, according to Flock and many police departments, these cameras are also helping to nab car thieves and locate missing persons.

All this raises the questions: Do ALPRs really have significant public safety benefits? And if so, is there a way to have our license plate surveillance and civil liberties too? 

To find out, I reviewed the latest academic research, dug through the worst horror stories in the news, and reached out to criminologists about the risks and rewards of ALPRs. Although the available evidence is limited, the technology appears to have modest — but genuine — crime-fighting benefits. And while the ALPR databases have been badly misused, this is in part because the tech has gone largely unregulated. With stringent safeguards, there may be a way to make it much harder for creeps and authoritarians to monitor law-abiding citizens’ comings and goings without forfeiting a useful law-enforcement tool.

The case for ALPRs

On a late summer day in Chamblee, Georgia, Leslie Barrera was pushing her 1-year-old son Mateo in a stroller when a car pulled up next to her. A man sprung out of the vehicle, pointed a gun at Barrera, and tried to grab the baby from his carriage. But he’d chosen his victim poorly: Barrera charged him, wrested away his gun, and tried to shoot the kidnapper, only for the firearm to jam. A woman (oddly, disguised as a man) then emerged from the car and snatched the child. The baby-nabbers proceeded to pile back into their vehicle and speed away.

With the aid of surveillance cameras, police quickly identified the car as a maroon Acura SUV. Unfortunately, the abductors had swapped out its valid license plate with a paper dealer tag. Decades earlier, that might have delayed, if not thwarted, the recovery effort. But this was 2020 — and Chamblee police had access to a Flock ALPR system. By searching through its database of vehicle photos, the cops discovered a shot of the same Acura with its registered metal license plate from days earlier. The plate led them to the suspect’s name and address — and thus, within just five hours of his abduction — to Mateo.

Flock has a lot of stories like this. The company boasts that their cameras “supported more than 1 million criminal investigations” and helped locate “more than 10,000 missing persons” last year. 

“Every single day, law enforcement across this country is using FLOCK technology to solve crime and find missing people faster,” Paris Lewbel, a spokesperson for Flock, told me. 

The limited evidence suggests that Flock’s claims about its cameras’ public safety benefits are overhyped.

But Flock’s colorful anecdotes and raw tallies tell us only so much. A Flock camera can be used in an investigation without making a decisive difference in its outcome. Without ALPR photos, Chamblee police may still have been able to tie the maroon Acura to Mateo’s kidnappers. 

To gauge Flock’s actual impact on public safety, we need (at a minimum) some quasi-experiments: When jurisdictions deploy advanced ALPR systems, do they see lower crime or higher clearance rates — both compared to their own past record and to simultaneous trends in Flock-less places?

There has been remarkably little research into these questions. But a recent study from the University of South Carolina’s Ian Adams and Scott Mourtgos sheds some light into them. 

Drawing on Flock’s installation records, the criminologists identified the month that 216 law enforcement agencies activated their first camera. They found that during the first year after Flock deployment, these areas saw an 11 percent decline in motor vehicle theft, relative to similar places that remained un-Flocked. Jurisdictions that put up the ALPRs also saw the success rate of their car theft investigations rise by 16 percent. 

These findings should be taken with a few grains of salt. For one thing, police departments will be more likely to invest in an ALPR system if they’ve got a serious stolen vehicle problem. And if car thefts in an area spike, they are liable to regress back toward historically typical levels, no matter what the local police department does. 

What’s more, agencies will often install ALPRs as part of broader anti-vehicle theft efforts, which may include deploying more officers to high-crime areas, among other things. Adams and Mourtgos’s data suggests that such simultaneous actions may be responsible for a portion of their results: Although Flock adopters solved stolen car cases at a higher rate after putting up the cameras, this rise tended to begin before the ALPRs were installed.

Nevertheless, the working paper indicates that Flock cameras do make some difference. “We’re not talking huge numbers here,” Mourtgos told me, “but it’s not nothing either.”

And there is reason to think that ALPRs have greater potential to deter and solve crimes than existing results suggest, as police departments may be deploying them in suboptimal ways. 

Consider a 2025 study of Atlantic City’s ALPR rollout. On paper, the municipality was an ideal candidate for the technology: As a barrier island, Atlantic City has only eight access points, so an ALPR network could easily capture every car entering and exiting the city. 

As one would hope, the research found that car theft declined after the cameras were erected, although the authors could not rule out other explanations. Perhaps more significantly, however, they discovered that the cameras produced vastly more leads than the department was capable of logging or investigating. Between November 2022 and November 2024, the city’s ALPRs issued 12,384 stolen vehicle alerts, virtually all of which went unnoticed or ignored by department personnel; over the studied period, the ALPR system prompted only 72 vehicle stops, of which just 52 concerned stolen cars. 

“In an ideal world, someone would be monitoring the alerts in real time and dispatching an officer, who would successfully make a traffic stop,” the paper’s co-author, Rowan University criminologist John Shjarback, told me. “But yeah, that kind of rarely happened.” 

Shjarback concludes that the department lacked enough patrol officers to respond to a significant portion of alerts, while its civilian surveillance center monitors appeared to simply miss a large proportion of serious hits. “They have a lot to do in that real-time crime center,” Shjarback said. “There’s a relatively high amount of crime and gun violence and whatnot in Atlantic City. One or two retired officers on duty just weren’t enough to do the live monitoring.” 

Similar operational flaws and resource constraints may have limited the efficacy of Flock systems in at least some of the areas analyzed by Adams and Mourtgos. Indeed, Mourtgos noted that many departments in his study lacked enough ALPRs to cover most significant thoroughfares. “Even in jurisdictions that are at the higher end on cameras, you’re still covering an extremely small minority of these roadway structures,” Mourtgos said. “So, that’s probably another reason why we see only modest effects.”

Taken together, the limited evidence suggests that Flock’s claims about its cameras’ public safety benefits are overhyped; its ALPR networks do not appear to be the “single greatest change” in policing tech “since DNA,” as the company touts on its website. But, as common sense might suggest, automatically logging all license plates on major highways and intersections seems to make it at least a bit harder to get away with stealing cars (and perhaps, babies).

Mass surveillance has its downsides

Of course, the fact that ALPRs offer some benefits to public safety does not mean that they’re necessarily worthwhile. Sewing a GPS chip into every American’s forearm would surely make crimes easier to solve and less tempting to commit. But most would regard such trackers as dystopian infringements on privacy and invitations to authoritarian control. 

And Flock’s ALPRS are much the same, in the view of their staunchest critics.

The “DeFlock” movement’s fundamental argument is that the cameras give police departments more information than they can be trusted with. One danger is that wayward cops can exploit the data to stalk their exes. The more profound threat, however, is that police agencies will use ALPR systems to deter or punish lawful dissent. 

And that hazard is not entirely hypothetical. After a writer named Canyen Ashworth published an op-ed criticizing local police in Lenexa, Kansas, that town’s police began tracking his movements with its ALPRs (apparently, because Ashworth’s column led the police chief to conclude, incorrectly, that he must have been the dastardly perp behind a recent spree of…unpermitted poster-hanging incidents).

More broadly, a 2025 investigation from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) found that more than 50 federal, state, and local agencies had run hundreds of searches related to protests or activist groups through Flock’s ALPR system. It’s not clear how many of these queries were motivated by an illiberal desire to monitor dissenters. In theory, a police officer could search for, say, “red sedan at No Kings protest” because a car of that description tried to run over protesters or committed some other criminal offense in the demonstration’s vicinity. And some of the searches tallied by EFF appear to fall into that category. But many others had no discernible purpose beyond the surveillance of activists.

We need to watch the watchmen

All this is unquestionably alarming. And if widespread misuse of ALPR networks were inevitable, then their costs to civil liberties would likely outweigh their modest (and as yet, not wholly certain) benefits for public safety.

But this probably isn’t the case. Rather, governments can likely limit ALPR’s downsides — while preserving their utility to law enforcement — by more stringently regulating the technology.

“In something like half of the states, there is no regulation. Virtually none, in our view, have adequate regulation.”

Barry Friedman, founding director of NYU School of Law’s Policing Project

Until recently, legislatures had placed scant guardrails on ALPRs. As the Congressional Research Service noted in 2024, there is “no specific federal legislative framework” governing law enforcement’s use of such cameras. And most states have no comprehensive ALPR regulations. Thus, if we’re failing to prevent police departments from misusing these cameras, it may be because most state and local governments haven’t actually tried. 

“In something like half of the states, there is no regulation,” Barry Friedman, the founding director of NYU School of Law’s Policing Project, told me. “Virtually none, in our view, have adequate regulation. The police decided to do this on their own. Them and their vendors made the decision and didn’t disclose what was happening.”

Fortunately, there is a long list of ways for policymakers to constrain abuse of ALPR data. To name just a few, governments could:

• Require police departments to delete logged location records after three weeks (or less), unless they are connected to a specific investigation (thereby leaving would-be stalkers and tyrants with less surveillance data to sift through). 
• Permit ALPR searches for only an enumerated set of law enforcement purposes, such as tracking stolen vehicles or suspected violent offenders. 
• Create an audit trail for every query documenting who searched for what, when, and under what justification.
• Mandate the use of software that automatically flags suspicious queries — such as someone searching for the same license plate over and over, without attaching an actual case number — and that temporarily locks out users who appear to be misusing the database. (Flock currently offers software with similar features, but most police departments with ALPRs are not legally required to adopt such systems.)
• Expressly forbid the use of the ALPR system for tracking people on the basis of protected speech.
• Punish intentional, unauthorized searches of the database with jail time.

Virginia’s recently enacted ALPR law includes many of these provisions, while several other states have embraced a subset of these policies.

Some may still want to get de-Flocked

To be sure, for some, even heavily regulated ALPR systems will entail intolerable costs to privacy and unacceptable risks of authoritarian misuse. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) supports efforts to regulate license plate readers, but only as a second-best alternative to banning the technology outright. 

“No guardrails can completely address the chilling effect of mass surveillance,” Chad Marlow, senior policy counsel at the ACLU, said. “When people know that they are being surveilled all the time, they may not intellectually dig into the, ‘Well, what exactly is happening with this data? What’s it being collected for? How long is it being stored?’ The average person isn’t going to go through all those steps.” 

Rather, Marlow argues, many will simply see cameras and fear that they’re being watched — and fearful of those doing the watching. 

“Someone who is an alcoholic and wants to go to an AA meeting — but doesn’t want the public or any of their insurance companies or the government knowing they’re an alcoholic — and knows there’s a camera outside of the church that hosts the meeting may just say, ‘You know what? It’s really important for me to keep this struggle private. And so I can’t go to that AA meeting,’” he said. 

These are legitimate concerns, although there is little hard evidence that license-plate readers have a chilling effect on protests or personal behavior. And given how much sensitive information people publicly share on social media — or willingly generate, through their internet activity — there’s some reason to doubt that many will refrain from lawful activity, merely because they spotted an ALPR by the side of the road. In fact, license plate readers have actually been in wide use for more than a decade and, until recently, few seemed to register their existence, much less, reorganize their lives around avoiding the cameras’ gaze. 

Still, reasonable people can disagree about how to weigh ALPRs’ trade-offs. My point here is merely that governments may be able to secure modest but meaningful public safety benefits from the cameras — while greatly reducing their misuse — by giving regulation a chance. Using the ALPRs of 2026 probably doesn’t require accepting the authoritarian nightmares of 1984.

AI will be the death of me. And you. And everyone we know.

At least, this is what a growing number of technologists and policymakers fear. 

Last week, a lead researcher at Anthropic declared that there was a greater than 10 percent chance of AI “killing all humans” within the next decade. This nerve-racking forecast, combined with recent AI-initiated cyberattacks, have fueled calls for slowing the progress of artificial intelligence — a proposal that Anthropic and OpenAI subsequently embraced.

Not all prophets of AI doom agree about precisely how this apocalypse would come about. Many focus on scenarios reminiscent of The Terminator films, in which superintelligent machines conspire to exterminate humanity — perhaps in the same not-quite-intentional way that humans laid waste to the dodo, or passenger pigeon.

But there is another, arguably more intuitive way that AI could bring about mass death, if not human extinction: by making it easier for people to develop and deploy catastrophic bioweapons. 

Importantly, this hypothetical doesn’t require AI models to become conscious or superintelligent; it merely requires them to accelerate preexisting trends in biotechnology. 

For those alarmed by this hypothetical, the threat AI poses is essentially twofold. First, when combined with technological progress in gene editing and DNA synthesis, chatbots could vastly increase the number of people capable of assembling dangerous viruses already known to medical science. And the more potential bioengineers there are in the world, the higher the odds that one will prove to be a diligent psychopath.

Second, AI could help highly trained biologists to discover — or engineer — a custom supervirus, which could then fall into the wrong hands. 

Recent headlines have lent some credence to both of these fears. 

Earlier this year, biologists warned that, with a few simple prompts, they’d gotten chatbots to dispense detailed instructions for engineering a treatment-resistant strain of an infamous pathogen, step-by-step protocols for recreating a once-pandemic virus, and advice on dispersing biological payloads via weather balloon.

In August, a team of scientists revealed that an AI model trained on DNA sequences had generated blueprints for deadly viruses unseen in nature (albeit, viruses deadly to bacteria, not animals). And last week, Anthropic announced that it had thwarted several suspected attempts by state actors to use Claude for bioweapons research.

Precisely how much AI is increasing the risk of an artificial pandemic is unclear. Even before ChatGPT, advances in synthetic biology were already making bioengineering tools more potent and accessible. And even after four years of rapid AI progress, the technical barriers to engineering novel superviruses remain formidable.

Regardless, there is a great deal more that governments can — and should — be doing to protect us from synthetic pandemics, both manmade and natural. No matter what AI’s ultimate impact on biosecurity proves to be, now is the time to both prepare for the worst-case scenario and, ideally, preempt it.

Why synthetic superviruses are scary

Before we dig into how AI could raise the risk of a man-made pandemic, it’s worth spelling out why that prospect is so unnerving. 

Put simply, few things could more credibly destroy civilization — and/or, the human species — than a synthetic supervirus.

Infectious diseases have killed more humans than any other force on Earth. The Black Death wiped out at least 30 percent of all Europeans in the 1300s, while the 1918 flu killed 50 million people worldwide. You don’t need me to tell you what things were like in 2020 (or how much worse they could have been, if vaccines hadn’t been rolled out in record time). 

And nature kicked off these catastrophes without even trying. A bioterrorist consciously seeking to maximize human death could theoretically improve on evolution’s handiwork. If biotech continues to advance — and scientists identify viral genomes that reliably yield high transmissibility and lethality — a malicious actor might one day be able to manufacture a virus that’s both as contagious as measles and as deadly as Ebola. 

Natural selection generally disfavors viruses that are both highly transmissible and profoundly fatal; bugs that kill their hosts too reliably often have difficulty spreading. Yet a virus with a long asymptomatic period could escape this tradeoff. For example, HIV can live in a person’s body for a decade before generating noticeable symptoms. In theory, a highly contagious respiratory virus could similarly lie in wait for many weeks, months, or even years.

If bioterrorists ever managed to unleash an easily transmitted, highly fatal virus, they could shake the foundations of modern existence. In that scenario, reliably showing up for work might require accepting a 50-50 chance  of getting yourself — and your family — brutally killed. Covid never required essential workers to assume risks anywhere near this high (the virus had a less than 1 percent case fatality rate among prime-age workers, before vaccines became available). Although there are many heroes among us, plenty of doctors, nurses, warehouse workers, power plant technicians, delivery drivers, and other essential laborers might not tolerate a coin flip’s chance of wiping out their loved ones. And if enough sheltered in place, systems for producing and distributing healthcare, food, water, and power could swiftly break down.

Humanity’s “Joker” problem

All this invites the question: Who would ever want to do this? 

After all, viruses are terrible weapons: They’re difficult to make, impossible to control, and jeopardize the lives of those who cultivate and distribute them. Partly for these reasons, biological weapons have hardly ever been used; the last fatal bioterror attacks were the anthrax mailings of 2001.

To this, anxious biosecurity experts might reply, to quote the former British intelligence officer Alfred Pennyworth: “Some men just want to watch the world burn.”

Mass shooters regularly forfeit their lives to the cause of killing others at random. And brilliant iconoclasts periodically develop murderous ideologies; Ted Kaczynski, the Harvard mathematician turned Unabomber, wished to bring about the collapse of industrial civilization.

And every once in a while, an aspiring supervillain gets graduate training in virology. In the 1990s, the Kyoto University-educated genetic engineer Seiichi Endo joined Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo death cult. Drawing on the group’s $1 billion in funds, Endo sought to weaponize Ebola, Q fever, botulinum, and anthrax — with the aim of killing as many nonbelievers as possible. 

Of course, Endo failed. And lone wolf psychopaths have never gotten their hands on anything more lethal than an assault weapon, bomb, or airplane. 

But some scientists believe that technological advances — including generative AI — may provide the Endos and Kaczynskis of tomorrow with catastrophic power. 

How AI and biotech could democratize bioterrorism

MIT biologist Kevin Esvelt is among his field’s most prominent Cassandras. And he has voiced two fundamental concerns. The first is that breakthroughs in synthetic biology and AI are rapidly expanding the pool of people who can engineer known viruses. 

Over the past 15 years, the cost and difficulty of editing genomes have plummeted. In 2012, to modify a specific site in a genome, you often needed access to custom-engineered proteins that cost upward of $5,000 and still tended to work poorly, according to Olivia Scharfman, a biotechnology fellow at the Institute for Progress. Thanks to the gene-editing tool CRISPR, a scientist with minimal lab training can execute such a modification for as little as $30. Meanwhile, DNA synthesis has also grown radically more affordable.

This might not be such a big deal, if dangerous biological materials were hard to legally access. But Esvelt and his colleagues recently demonstrated that this isn’t the case. As an experiment, they had a student place orders for pieces of the 1918 influenza genome using a pseudonym and fake position. Thirty-six of 38 DNA synthesis companies shipped the genomes without asking whether the applicant had government permission or sound intentions. Together, these fragments were enough to create the virus many times over.

Crucially, in Esvelt’s account, reverse engineering known viruses using modern tools does not require elite skills. Any random biology graduate student may be up to the job. 

And AI may be making such rudimentary viral engineering even easier. 

In theory, a chatbot can help you plan a bioweapons attack in much the same way that it can walk you through fixing a dishwasher: By finding and synthesizing the internet’s vast trove of information, offering step-by-step instructions for navigating unfamiliar challenges, and fielding all troubleshooting queries that might subsequently arise.

And there’s evidence that AI models will in fact provide would-be bioterrorists with precisely this kind of assistance.

In a 2023 study, MIT researchers asked students to seek guidance on engineering a pandemic from that era’s chatbots. Within an hour, the AI models had suggested four promising pathogens, offered detailed protocols for manufacturing them with with synthetic DNA, provided a list of DNA synthesis retailers with low screening standards, and advised that — if users still found themselves unable to make the virus, even with all this help — they could purchase the assistance of a contract research organization to do some of the bioengineering for them. 

And of course, frontier models have gotten a lot better since 2023. Last year, SecureBio, Esvelt’s biosecurity nonprofit, found that one OpenAI model outperformed 94 percent of expert virologists on troubleshooting complex laboratory problems. 

Anthropic’s internal research has produced similar results. In one experiment, the company tasked amateurs with drafting a bioweapons acquisition plan. It gave some participants access to basic internet resources and others the assistance of Claude models (with the safeguards turned off). Those working with AI developed far more viable blueprints, according to the biodefense experts who scrutinized the proposals for critical errors.

Thus, there’s reason to think that the number of people with the skills and resources necessary for reverse engineering a virus from genomic blueprints is sharply rising — and with it, the risk that a bloodthirsty nihilist or ideologue gets their hands on a dangerous pathogen.

AI might help scientists learn too much

What’s even worse than bringing back smallpox? Esvelt’s second concern is that these same technological forces — combined with top scientists’ often reckless ambitions — will lead to the discovery or development of a supervirus, a new or custom-designed pathogen even more dangerous than what nature has come up with in the past.

Today, some scientists are actively trying to discover — and publicly identify — novel viruses circulating in nature that could theoretically trigger the next pandemic. Others conduct so-called gain-of-function experiments, altering pathogens to discern which mutations make them more transmissible, lethal, or difficult to detect (some have alleged that Covid-19 emerged from precisely this kind of research, though that theory is widely rejected among epidemiologists). This work is generally intended to anticipate future epidemiological threats, so that we can develop vaccines before they arrive. But their work could inadvertently provide bad actors with recipes for reverse engineering mass-casualty bioweapons. 

Separately, advances in gene editing and AI may enable breakthroughs in viral engineering that yield apocalyptic pathogens. 

A recent study from researchers at Stanford and the Arc Institute fed such fears. The scientists trained an AI called “Evo” on the DNA sequences of bacteriophages, the simple viruses that infect bacteria. They then used this “genomic language model” to generate blueprints for hundreds of bacteriophages found nowhere in nature. Sixteen of these designs yielded viable pathogens, some of which were better at killing bacteria than their natural ancestors. 

What is clear, however, is that novel pathogens are among the greatest security threats our species faces.

Theoretically, scientists may one day be able to engineer novel human viruses using the same basic techniques. What’s more, even if genomic-language models fail at that task, they might still be able to help users tweak existing viruses in ways that render them more transmissible, deadly, or vaccine-resistant.

These discoveries could theoretically filter down to amateur bioterrorists or well-funded extremist groups like Aum Shinrikyo. Alternatively, a state-sponsored weapons program could develop a catastrophic supervirus, then unleash it on the world through a lab leak or (perhaps, more improbably) a deliberate attempt at genocide. 

There is some precedent for the former scenario: The Soviet Union tried to weaponize smallpox and the Marburg virus, despite the considerable hazards and dubious military utility of such bioweapons. In the process, Soviet scientists accidentally triggered a smallpox outbreak during testing, while also letting anthrax leak from a laboratory, killing at least 64 people.

Bioweapons ain’t easy

All this said, there are reasons to question whether AI is truly making a synthetic pandemic more likely. 

Chatbots may solve some of the challenges facing an amateur biologist with omnicidal aspirations. But it doesn’t necessarily clear the biggest obstacles in that person’s path. 

Viral engineering is a complex, difficult, and physical undertaking. Performing it successfully requires what scientists call “tacit knowledge” — practical skills and understandings that are difficult to explain in words: knowing how to suppress the hand tremors that could rip delicate DNA strands, or how to recognize when the DNA in your solution has reached the proper concentration, or how to smell when a sample has been contaminated.

And these are things that Claude still can’t reliably impart. In studies, amateurs with access to a large language model tend to perform better on written biological challenges — but not on actual lab work. In a 2026 randomized study, non-scientists working with frontier AI systems were no more likely to complete a multistep laboratory assignment than those relying on the internet alone. 

Of course, tacit knowledge wouldn’t necessarily be a problem for aspiring bioterrorists in the mold of Seiichi Endo — graduate-trained scientists with extensive lab experience. But at a minimum, chatbots don’t appear to have turned every malcontent who once took AP Bio into a competent virologist.

And while AI will likely help top biologists advance their field’s frontiers, the barriers to custom engineering doomsday viruses remain formidable. The “Evo” experiment is arguably a case in point. Although the model did generate working blueprints for a few novel bacteriophages, nearly all of its suggested genomes didn’t work. Researchers had to arduously test hundreds of DNA sequences to arrive at 16 viable strands. And engineering slightly modified versions of an extremely small, well-known bacteriophage capable of infecting E. coli in a lab — and creating a novel virus more fearsome than any nature has yet devised — aren’t especially similar tasks. 

To offer a strained analogy: The fact that I can dunk on Victor Wembanyama in NBA 2K26 does not imply that I’m making progress toward being able to dunk on him in real life.

Even in the age of CRISPR and ChatGPT, biology remains an exceptionally difficult discipline that resists reliable modeling. The effects of modifying a single gene can often yield unpredictable and inconsistent results, varying with host biology, immune responses, and environmental conditions that scientists only partly understand. AI may help us overcome these complexities. It also might not.

We need to be preparing for the next pandemic

Scientists disagree about how serious a risk synthetic pandemics pose — and how much AI is magnifying it.

What is clear, however, is that novel pathogens are among the greatest security threats our species faces. Even if synthetic biology and artificial intelligence did not exist, natural selection would keep churning out new viruses — and periodically hitting upon ones that befuddle human immune systems. 

For this reason, there would be an urgent need to make our societies less vulnerable to future pandemics, irrespective of AI’s implications for viral engineering. In a world where chatbots and CRISPR are plausibly making bioterrorism easier, failing to invest aggressively in public health is all the more reckless.

The good news is we already know — from hard-earned experience — many steps that we can take to reduce the risk of a new pandemic and prepare to respond to one if needed. 

Governments can limit the destructive power of novel contagions by investing in vaccines that protect against entire families of viruses (or ideally, all of them) and broad-spectrum antivirals; raise our odds of catching outbreaks early by funding meticulous wastewater and clinical surveillance; ensure that essential workers don’t have to choose between staying alive and keeping civilization going amid a pandemic by developing and then stockpiling foolproof personal protective equipment; make indoor spaces less hospitable to airborne viruses by upgrading ventilation and filtration systems; and reduce the the threat of bioterrorism by mandating rigorous screening of synthetic-DNA orders.

Fears that humanity will be done in by superintelligent machines are currently galvanizing media attention and political concern. And this may be warranted. But we should pay at least as much attention to our species’ age-old, organic adversaries as we do to our hypothetical, robot ones — and not just because the latter could start teaching the former new tricks.