Last week, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a small pill called enlicitide. It is a tablet you swallow once a day on an empty stomach with a sip of black coffee, water, or tea. But it does something that until now took a needle and a specialist’s prescription: It lowers the most dangerous kind of cholesterol by nearly 60 percent, about as much as the strongest injectable drugs on the market.

If that sounds less innovative than some of the medical advances I sometimes cover here — there’s no AI or gene editing involved — you’re missing the story. Enlicitide is just the latest example of how medicine has been quietly making progress against the deadliest thing in the modern world.

That thing is heart disease. It has been the leading cause of death in the United States for essentially a century, and in 2025 it killed 694,708 Americans — about one in five deaths — more than every form of cancer combined. Around the world, cardiovascular disease kills roughly 20 million people a year, the biggest cause of death on the planet.

But today, our enemy is on the retreat. In the US, the age-adjusted death rate from cardiovascular disease has fallen about three-quarters since 1950. In plain terms: A 60-year-old today is roughly four times less likely to die of heart disease this year than a 60-year-old was when Harry Truman was president. As I wrote last year, deaths specifically from heart attacks are down 89 percent since 1970.

That progress comes down to a single number. Low-density lipoprotein, or LDL, aka the “bad” cholesterol your doctor always wants you to lower. Until recently, a high LDL score was all but inescapable, something you could nudge lower with a better diet and willpower but struggle to really fix. What has changed is that we can now lower LDL for nearly anyone who needs it — further, more easily, and earlier in life than before.

A lifesaving genetic mutation

It’s a story that goes back 20 years. In the early 2000s, two geneticists at University of Texas Southwestern, Helen Hobbs and Jonathan Cohen, wanted to solve a medical mystery: Why did some individuals have striking low cholesterol levels? They combed the Dallas Heart Study for an answer. They found a handful — many of them Black Americans — carrying a broken copy of a gene called PCSK9. Their bodies cleared LDL from the blood with unusual efficiency, and the payoff was staggering: carriers of the strongest variant had about 28 percent lower LDL and roughly 88 percent lower risk of heart disease than people who did not carry the mutation.

That finding proved lowering LDL prevents heart attacks, and it handed drugmakers a target: copy that gene. Every PCSK9 drug since — including the new enlicitide — imitates a mutation a few people in Dallas were simply born with.

Millions of Americans still take the old cholesterol-lowering workhorses, statins, and they’ve proven highly effective at reducing heart disease for most people. But not everyone: Some people can’t tolerate the muscle aches; others take them faithfully and still don’t get their LDL low enough. Enlicitide is built for exactly those people: a pill as cholesterol-lowering as an injection but without the needle, and a drug that spares them the statin muscle aches.

Closing the loop

If the pill is today, gene editing is tomorrow — and it may be the answer to a problem no pill can reliably solve: getting people to keep taking their medicine.

About half of patients on statins quit them within a year, and a daily pill, however potent, only helps the people who actually take it. So that demands a fix you can’t forget. A company called Verve Therapeutics, now owned by Eli Lilly, has been testing a treatment that makes a single-letter edit to the PCSK9 gene in the liver — one infusion, in theory for life. In its first human trial, published over the spring in the New England Journal of Medicine, a single dose cut LDL by as much as 62 percent, and held it there for more than a year. Instead of a pill mimicking the effects of the genetic mutation that protected those people in Dallas, gene editing just switches off the gene.

As important as it is, cholesterol isn’t the whole story when it comes to heart disease. There’s smoking, which declined from about 40 percent of US adults in the 1960s to under 15 percent today, sparing countless arteries. High blood pressure — the silent condition that killed President Franklin D. Roosevelt at 63 in 1945, when doctors had few effective ways to treat it — can now be caught early and treated with cheap generic pills.

And then there are the GLP-1s. More than one in 10 US adults say they are currently on an anti-obesity drug, and whatever else you may think of them, they’ll make a significant dent in heart disease. In one major trial semaglutide cut cardiovascular events by 20 percent.

The war continues

Still, the war on heart disease won’t be easy to win.

Just because a pill like enlicitide has been proven to lower a lab value does not mean it’s yet proven to lower deaths. They should — the injectable versions of these drugs cut heart attacks and strokes by about 20 percent in long trials. But enlicitide’s own outcomes study won’t conclude for years.

Precisely because the condition itself so widespread, treatments for heart disease will only be effective if they are equally widespread.

Heart disease is shifting, too. The same research showing heart-attack deaths down 89 percent found deaths from other heart conditions — heart failure, arrhythmias, hypertensive disease — up 81 percent since 1970, though because heart attacks were killing several times as many people, overall heart-disease deaths have still dropped by about two-thirds since 1970.  Some of that shift is perversely the result of success: people who might have died of an initial heart attack now live long enough for the heart to wear out in other ways. And some of this is the reverse of progress: As smoking and cholesterol fell, obesity climbed to about 40 percent of US adults, pulling diabetes and high blood pressure with it.

And then there’s perhaps the biggest problem in medicine: access. A 60 percent drop in cholesterol helps only the people who can actually get the drug. Half of patients abandon cheap statins within a year. Enlicitide arrives at about $300 a month with uncertain insurance coverage. The gene edit, whenever it becomes available, will certainly cost far more, and at first will reach only the sickest.

More than 60 percent of US adults are projected to have some form of heart disease over the course of their life. Precisely because the condition itself so widespread, treatments for heart disease will only be effective if they are equally widespread.

Which brings us back to that unassuming little pill. It’s just a tablet, doing what a generation of scientists spent their careers trying to do: turning one of the deadliest numbers in medicine into one you can change. It’s the kind of progress that’s too easy to miss — until it saves your life.

A version of this story originally appeared in the Good News newsletter. Sign up here!

Abdul El-Sayed is among America’s most prominent proponents of Medicare-for-all. 

The frontrunner in Michigan’s Democratic Senate primary literally wrote the book on that policy (or at least, a book on it). In El-Sayed’s view, Medicare should cover “all necessary healthcare” for every American — without co-pays, premiums, or deductibles — and be “accepted everywhere.”

Alas, despite his many years of advocacy, El-Sayed has seemingly failed to persuade his wife of that last point: According to a recent report from the Washington Free Beacon, El-Sayed’s partner, the psychiatrist Sarah Jukaku, does not accept Medicare as a form of payment at her private practice.

This bit of gossip is of little importance, in and of itself. The Free Beacon’s story does nothing to refute the case for El-Sayed’s candidacy or his healthcare plan (his wife’s business is, well, her business). As hit pieces go, it’s weak tea.

Nevertheless, the tension between El-Sayed’s healthcare proposals and his wife’s business practices is real. And it is illustrative of a major challenge facing anyone who wishes to reform our nation’s misbegotten healthcare system: To meet the medical needs of all Americans, reformers will need to defy the interests of most doctors — and in many cases reduce their compensation. 

And that won’t be easy. Few people feel a deep fondness for insurance companies. But El-Sayed is far from the only American who loves a physician.

The biggest obstacle to Medicare-for-all

To understand why Medicare-for-all would be bad news for many doctors — and how the Free Beacon’s story illustrates that point — we must first dwell on one fundamental fact about America’s healthcare system: It’s a rip-off. 

The US spends about twice as much per person on medical goods and services as other wealthy countries. And yet, all that money does not actually buy us much more care. Compared to our peers abroad, Americans are less likely to see a doctor, secure a long hospital stay, or access a timely appointment for medical treatment. On the other hand, we do have the privilege of paying radically higher healthcare prices.

To take just one telling example: In the United States, a coronary bypass surgery will typically cost more than $89,000; in Australia, it costs just $17,741.

Such exorbitant prices are the chief obstacle to any version of universal healthcare. Even with one-third of working-age Americans uninsured or underinsured — and thus, consuming too little medical care — the bill for America’s health sector ran to $5.7 trillion in 2025. 

In El-Sayed’s vision, Americans would consume vastly more medical services than they do today: The uninsured would suddenly have access to every doctor in the country, while everyone else would see their co-pays and deductibles drop to zero, encouraging them to schedule far more doctors’ visits.

This would be a costly proposition in any country. At America’s current healthcare prices, it would be prohibitively expensive. There is simply no way to realize anything approaching the left’s healthcare ambitions without slashing the amount of money that Americans pay per medical service. 

Doctors will pay a price for universal healthcare

Medicare-for-all advocates are aware of this fact. And they’re typically eager to talk about one source of America’s high healthcare prices: The inefficiencies of our private health insurance model. 

In America’s byzantine system, each insurer needs its own teams of auditors, claims reviewers, and myriad other specialists, while every major healthcare provider needs a horde of administrators to navigate the idiosyncratic rules of all these different insurance companies. Americans pay dearly for this bureaucratic bloat. By one estimate, our system’s administrative costs are $500 billion higher than they would be if the insurance industry was consolidated into a single public insurer. 

And yet, as large as that figure may seem, it still represents a fraction of America’s excess healthcare costs. The primary cause of our nation’s exorbitant medical prices is simpler than administrative redundancies: our healthcare providers charge exceptionally high rates.

Hospitals are the biggest culprits on this front. But physicians are also part of the problem.

According to a 2026 study from economists at the University of Chicago, Stanford, and the US Census Bureau, American physicians earn about twice as much as Canadian ones — and four times as much as Swedish doctors. 

Critically, this does not merely reflect America’s greater wealth or wage inequality. It is true that educated professionals of all kinds — financial analysts, lawyers, software engineers, etc. — earn more in the US than they do in other rich countries. But American doctors don’t just earn unusually high absolute incomes — they also occupy an atypically rarified place within their own country’s class hierarchy. About 42 percent of American specialty physicians are in the top 1 percent of their nation’s income earners. Among Canadian specialists, that figure is just 27 percent; for Swedish ones, it is 7 percent.

The main driver of these disparities is straightforward: America imposes fewer price controls on its healthcare sector than other nations do. 

And this is where Jukaku’s practice reenters the picture. 

The public parts of America’s insurance system — Medicare and Medicaid — pay rates that are only modestly above international norms. It is when American doctors bill private insurers — or the rich consumers of boutique medicine — that they really make bank.

As a result, top clinicians like Jukaku often decline to take Medicare. If you’ve got affluent patients beating down your door, accepting Uncle Sam’s rates just doesn’t pay.

Unless the government forces doctors and hospitals to swallow steep pay cuts, however, Medicare-for-all won’t pencil out. According to a widely cited 2018 analysis by the economist Charles Blahous, if a single-payer system kept provider payments constant, national health spending would rise by $3.25 trillion over a decade, even with administrative savings taken into account. By contrast, if all providers were forced to accept Medicare’s rates, health spending would actually fall by $2.05 trillion over the same period.

Soaking physicians is tough politics

Thus, there is a clear conflict between progressives’ healthcare ambitions and medical providers’ material interests. 

Yet the left is often reluctant to acknowledge this reality. El-Sayed tends to portray insurers as the sole economic beneficiaries — and political defenders — of America’s inequitable healthcare system. The fact that hospitals and doctors also profit off the status quo’s dysfunctions does not feature prominently in his rhetoric. To the contrary, El-Sayed suggested in 2020 that doctors like his wife are actually underpaid, even though American psychiatrists earn far higher salaries than their counterparts abroad. 

To be fair, progressives aren’t alone in eliding providers’ culpability. Virtually all Democratic politicians do the same. And not without reason. Politically speaking, it is one thing to denounce the greed of private insurers — the faceless bureaucracies standing between Americans and their desired treatments. It’s quite another to call for reducing the wages of doctors, men and women who perform laudatory work and enjoy widespread admiration. 

Precisely for this reason, however, reformers must grapple with healthcare providers’ investment in the current system. The American Medical Association (AMA), the lobby representing our nation’s physicians, was instrumental in killing past attempts to move toward single-payer. And at least some segments of the medical profession would surely mobilize against any contemporary Medicare-for-all bill that imposed substantial cost controls on the healthcare sector. What’s more, in doing so, they would be able to draw on a resource the private insurance industry lacks — the public’s trust.

How to make healthcare less expensive right now

There is no easy answer to the problems all this presents. But part of the solution is to chip away at providers’ payment rates where progressives already have the power to do so. This would not only help drive down costs for existing healthcare in the short term, an urgent priority all its own, but also would smooth the path to universal coverage in the long run.

That project can take many forms. One would be state-level payment regulations. In Maryland, hospitals receive the same rates, no matter whether their patients pay with Medicare, private insurance, or cash. And their budgets are also fixed, so that they aren’t able to milk fees out of unnecessary care. Rhode Island, meanwhile, caps the growth of its hospital reimbursement rates at the pace of overall inflation. Other states could follow their lead. 

But policymakers should also address the supply constraints that undergird American doctors’ high salaries. US physicians’ ability to command high pay doesn’t just reflect America’s weak cost controls but also a persistent shortage of working doctors. The US has roughly 2.7 physicians for every 1,000 of its residents; the average among comparable countries is 3.9, according to a Kaiser Family Foundation analysis.

In this context, forcing down doctors’ pay might seem perilous. After all, doing so would reduce young people’s incentive to pursue a medical career, potentially deepening the shortage. 

In reality, however, there is no dearth of qualified people who want to practice medicine in the US. We just don’t let many of them do so.

This is partly because American policymakers consciously sought to restrict the number of doctors in the country, beginning in the 1980s. As Robert Orr of the Niskanen Center explains, the US government issued a report in 1981 warning of an imminent “physician surplus” and recommending “immediate action to curtail both the domestic training of physicians as well as the admittance of those trained outside of the country.”

The report’s argument rested on false premises; it failed to anticipate that Americans’ demand for healthcare would rise sharply as they grew wealthier. Nonetheless, its recommendations were largely implemented: Federal support for medical-school scholarships was pared back while funding for residencies has been capped since 1997. 

At the same time, policymakers maintained high barriers to the immigration of fully-trained foreign doctors: Even physicians with years of experience, and credentials in nations with high medical standards, are typically required to complete a multi-year residency before being able to practice in the US.

Ending the federal freeze on residency funding will require congressional action. But states can immediately make it easier for foreign doctors to practice within their borders. In fact, Tennessee established a pathway for such physicians to ply their trade in the state, without having to repeat a residency, in 2023. And many states subsequently enacted similar reforms.

Removing the bottlenecks on America’s doctor supply won’t eliminate the political hurdles to Medicare-for-all. But it would put downward pressure on doctors’ salaries, reduce the risks of capping physician pay, and make the left’s vision of healthcare abundance more feasible. After all, you can’t actually eliminate the care rationing that so many Americans resent by extending insurance coverage or enacting price controls alone. No matter how we pay for our medical services, we can only deliver as much care as our health sector’s resources allow. 

Don’t hate the doctor, love the sick

In saying all this, I don’t mean to convey disdain for the medical profession. Like El-Sayed, some of my best friends are doctors! In fact, my mother, father, brother, and sister-in-law are all physicians. And they all have contributed far more to American society than I ever will. My brother spends his workdays providing lifesaving treatments to cancer patients; I often spend mine sitting at a desk in my pajamas, arguing about politics on the internet. 

Physicians deserve to be well-paid for their strenuous labor. But if we want healthcare in America to be universally affordable and widely accessible, we will need to pay many of them a bit less.

What caused the ongoing outbreak of cyclospora, the diarrhea-causing parasite currently spreading across the United States? Michigan officials have been saying for weeks that they believed the outbreak may be linked to bagged salad or salad kits. What we were waiting to learn was the specific brands and specific products in question. 

And late last week, it looked like we finally had the answer — but then things quickly got cloudy. 

On July 16, the Washington Post reported, citing anonymous sources, that the outbreak had been linked to shredded iceberg lettuce supplied to Taco Bell by Taylor Farms. A day later, Taylor Farms said it was withdrawing products from US stores and restaurants based on information from the FDA.

But then on July 19, per NBC News, the FDA said that there had been a false positive for cyclospora when testing a sample of Taylor Farms iceberg lettuce; Taylor Farms said in its own statement that the FDA had “apologized” for the mix-up. The next day, the company and the federal government were stuck in a semantic argument: Per NOTUS, the FDA insisted it did not “officially apologize” to Taylor Farms but “explain[ed] factually the issues” with the false positive. 

So where does that leave us right now? Officials still believe that Taylor Farms iceberg lettuce was the source of the Michigan outbreak. But whether those are the only products driving the outbreak remains unclear, with almost every state now reporting at least one cyclospora case in 2026. And on Thursday afternoon, the FDA announced that it was tracking a second outbreak linked to other unspecific products, though details were otherwise scarce.

Any outbreak of food-borne illness requires careful public communication. Officials need to tell people how to avoid contaminated food without scaring them away from eating fresh fruits and vegetables altogether.

But instead, many Americans have been left wondering what, exactly, they’re supposed to do. As one frustrated Reddit user put it: “So is the damn lettuce bad or not????” (If you need some advice on what foods are safe and what foods to be cautious about, we have a story for you.)

It may sound like a funny question, but it’s a profoundly serious one. The problem isn’t just that people are confused about their lettuce. The Trump administration’s handling of the cyclospora outbreak — from its conflicting public messages to accusations of political favoritism — has left many Americans even more confused about whether they can trust anything they’re hearing from the government. That’s a dangerous place to be during any public health emergency.

The cyclospora outbreak has become a communications nightmare

We are approaching 10,000 cyclosporiasis cases across the US this year: Michigan alone has recorded 7,664 as of this morning, Ohio has seen more than 1,200, and more than 40 states have now reported at least one case in 2026. The country usually sees a few hundred cases at most in a given year. Cyclosporiasis, the disease caused by the cyclospora parasite, leads to what public health experts describe as “watery” and “frequently explosive” diarrhea. While it isn’t typically life-threatening, it can cause serious complications: 160 people have been hospitalized in Michigan since the outbreak began.

And so for those of us who very much hope to eat fresh produce but do not want diarrhea, there’s a bit of urgency to figure out where the cyclospora is coming from. Food-borne illness investigations are already inherently difficult because of how globalized our food supply has become: Produce can travel all over the country and the world before it comes to your grocery shelf, and the process of government health workers interviewing the people who get sick and cross-checking to identify the shared foods that they might have in common is laborious.

Once investigators find a source, the information has to be shared clearly and responsibly. That is where the Trump administration has tripped up this week. 

Trump — and Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in particular — came into office criticizing the public health establishment. They accused officials of misleading the public about the novel coronavirus and the vaccines developed to fight it, while failing to convey the nuances of the pandemic. But now, as they grapple with the incomplete picture of the cyclospora emergency, they are making many of the same mistakes.

“They’re very similar problems, even if on the outside, they don’t look quite the same,” said Michael Mackert, director of the Center for Health Communication at the University of Texas at Austin. “The underlying commonality is very much that we are dealing with imperfect information all the time.”

In any outbreak, some uncertainty is to be expected. Investigators have struggled to identify the source of earlier cyclosporiasis outbreaks too. And the FDA maintains that the likely source of the outbreak is Taylor Farms iceberg lettuce, based on the information they have gathered from sick patients and other sources, no matter the false positive result that has sparked so much confusion.

“The epidemiological evidence is so strong that the lack of a positive test is almost meaningless,” said Francisco Diez-Gonzalez, director of the Center for Food Safety at the University of Georgia. 

But the mistake that the Trump administration made was in sharing preliminary results and then having to issue a seemingly contradictory statement shortly afterward.

“FDA should have waited for confirmation of the presumptive results before going public,” Diez-Gonzalez said.

The larger stakes of the Trump administration’s poor communication

Investigations like these are hard enough — but when you add in the public health funding cuts of the past 18 months and the casual and widespread corruption characteristic of the Trump administration, trust in the government’s public health apparatus has sunk even lower.

It’s created just the conditions for conspiracies to bloom. “Unfortunately our FDA is compromised,” wrote one top commenter on Reddit. “I would not trust what comes out of it during this administration.” 

Several news outlets and influential social media accounts noted that Taylor Farms had donated $1 million to Trump’s MAGA super PAC and, in the middle of the controversy, received a private White House meeting. According to the New York Times, Taylor Farm officials used that meeting to dispute the findings that their products were responsible for the outbreak — and shortly thereafter, the FDA made its “false positive” announcement.

The administration insists that their decision-making is being guided by science, but even the appearance of impropriety has become a common theme in the press coverage. The broader uncertainty and distrust may help to explain why it’s not only Taco Bell and Taylor Farms taking a hit right now: According to Market Watch, Chipotle and the fast-casual salad chain Chopt have also seen a decline in traffic in recent weeks.

Public health requires public confidence. Perceived influence from special interests is a problem, even if the interactions didn’t alter the FDA or CDC’s actions.

Kennedy, who helms our government’s health department, should understand this well: His Make America Healthy Again movement made restoring public trust a central part of its message while accusing the existing public health establishment as being in league with special interests. 

The cyclospora outbreak has revealed how difficult that is to do in practice. 

In trying to communicate nuanced information during an active outbreak — while consulting interested parties like Taylor Farms itself — the administration has instead fueled doubts about the credibility of its messaging

Even before cyclospora turned eating salad into a leap of faith, Trump had a poor track record: His administration has slashed CDC staff, brought on vaccine skeptics to set vaccine policy, and clashed with the scientific establishment on a number of high-profile issues, like the time Trump held a televised press conference to argue a disproven theory that Tylenol can cause autism.

“Unfortunately, this is another example of a missed opportunity to establish credible and trusted communications to prepare the public to understand the real risks from the pathogen and confidence in the food safety and information from the FDA,” Scott Ratzan, editor-in-chief of the Journal of Health Communication: International Perspectives, told me. “Faith in our institutions continues to erode. We could do better.”

We are lucky cyclospora is not a deadly disease. Next time, the stakes for these miscues could be much higher.

This story was originally published in The Highlight. To get access to member-exclusive stories like this every month, become a Vox Member today.

Emily Hoffman was walking home from lunch in the Pittsburgh neighborhood of Squirrel Hill in February 2023, when a driver turning left struck her on the crosswalk.

Hoffman was 34. By the time paramedics arrived on the scene, she had gone into a traumatic cardiac arrest. They strapped her onto a machine that delivered automated chest compressions and rushed her to UPMC Presbyterian, a major trauma hospital in Pittsburgh.

Over the next several days, doctors performed multiple surgeries, kept Hoffman on a ventilator, and waited until she was stable enough for an MRI. The scans showed multiple strokes and severe traumatic brain injury. She was alive, but her family understood that she was not going to make a meaningful recovery to a life she would have wanted.

The next Thursday, a week after the crash, Emily’s parents and her sister Beth Hoffman met with the care team and decided to remove ventilator support to allow her to die naturally. Organ donation came up only afterward. Emily was already a registered donor, and Beth knew it was what her sister wanted.

For most of the short history of organ transplantation, Emily would not have been the usual kind of organ donor.

Almost all transplanted organs once came from patients who died in one specific and rare way called brain death, in which the brain has irreversibly stopped functioning, even as machines keep the heart beating and the organs supplied with oxygen. Brain death is extraordinarily rare,  but it happens often enough to create a workable — though far from sufficient — supply of life-saving organs.

But Emily was not one of the brain-death donors. Even after the strokes and brain injury, she still had some reflexes. She was dying, but not brain dead.

Her donation followed a different path, one that has transformed American transplantation in the last decade. It is called donation after circulatory death, or DCD. Instead of death being declared because the brain has stopped functioning, in DCD, death is declared after circulation ceases and the heart stops beating. Many more people die this way than by brain death.

Death by circulatory criteria has been legally recognized since the 1980s, but for decades, doctors rarely recovered organs this way, because, once blood stops moving through the body, organs begin to deteriorate within minutes. In recent years, however, new machines and surgical techniques have helped change that, giving doctors the ability to preserve organs outside the body, making DCD far more viable.

↗ Explore the interactive version of this chart.

Hoffman’s donation is hardly an outlier anymore. In the last decade, DCD has gone from a rare practice to something that now accounts for nearly half of all organ donors who have died in the United States. In 2000, DCD donors supplied just 219 organs (kidneys, livers, lungs, hearts, and pancreas combined) to the transplantation system in the US. In 2025, DCD brought in close to 17,000 organs. (Most transplanted organs, about 85 percent, come from dead donors, though some organs, most often kidneys, can also come from living donors.)

That growth has saved lives, but it has also pushed transplant medicine into an unusually sensitive moment: the time after a family has decided to let their loved one die but before death has actually occurred.

In brain-death donation, a patient has already been declared dead before the possibility of donation is raised with the family. Because most brain-dead donors are on ventilators, with machines supplying oxygenated blood to their organs, transplant teams can take their time with the donation process.

DCD doesn’t offer that same cushion. Because organs deteriorate so quickly after circulation ceases, the work of donation — the testing, matching, surgical teams flying in — has to be set in motion once the family has decided to withdraw life support but before the patient has died.

This is where the tension in DCD begins. The process pushes transplantation into the narrow interval between that decision to let someone die and the moment death occurs. It creates a situation with almost no parallel in medicine: one set of hands caring for the dying, even as another prepares to recover and transplant their organs.

The medical system tries to manage that complexity with a strict procedural sequence. First, hospital doctors and family conclude that no treatment will bring the patient back to a life they would have wanted. Only then, and only from a separate team, does the word donation come up. The firewall is in place so that the need for organs never shapes the decision to let someone die. 

“Ethically, you want to make sure that those two are uncoupled,” said Wade Smith, director of the Neurovascular Service at the University of California San Francisco.

But as DCD has scaled up, more weight is put on that narrow interval. What was once a rare event is now routine in hospitals across the country, carried out by teams with different levels of experience and overseen through rules that can vary from one place to another. At the same time, the organizations that handle organ donations are under new federal pressure to acquire and distribute more organs from eligible donors.

DCD has saved thousands of lives by making donations possible from patients who once wouldn’t have been donors. Hoffman’s donation improved several lives at once: Her kidneys went to two men, her liver to a third recipient, and her corneas helped give sight to a nine-month-old baby. 

But its growth has also made the fragile period before death more consequential: how families are told, which steps can be taken while the patient is still alive, how consistently hospitals and organ donation teams follow safeguards, and who has the authority to stop the process if something feels wrong.

When DCD was still rare, these questions stayed at the edges of transplantation. Now, they are moving towards its center, as a lifesaving practice becomes a routine part of how Americans die and donate.

The breakthrough

Modern transplantation is a relatively young field, only about 70 years old. And from the beginning, transplantation has depended on the novel medical achievement of keeping organs functional after a person had been declared dead.

The mechanical ventilator, developed in the 1950s, made that possible. It could keep a body breathing, and its heart beating, even after the brain had stopped for good. That created, for the first time, a situation where patients were deceased by every older measure, even as their organs were still functional.

Surgeons were initially wary of recovering organs, largely because the legal lines between life and death had never been clearly drawn. Then, in 1968, a Harvard committee proposed a definition of brain death. By 1981, a model law gave states the language to recognize two ways of legal death. Your heart and lungs could stop for good (circulatory death) or your entire brain could (brain death). Today, every state recognizes some version of that framework.

With those lines in place, transplant teams could work with more confidence, and brain death turned out to be close to ideal for them. Because a ventilator kept the heart beating and blood moving through the organs, even after death, there was no ticking clock to race against. The hospital staff had time to evaluate the organs, sometimes convince families to donate them, find the right recipients, and bring in surgical teams before recovery began.

The problem was always with the math. Brain death is rare — only about three in 1,000 deaths happen in a way that leaves organs usable for transplant. That puts a hard biological ceiling on how many ideal donors there could ever be.

But demand for the organs had no such ceiling. Nearly a million Americans are diagnosed with heart failure each year, while surgeons performed just 4,636 heart transplants in 2024, after DCD became a widely used part of transplantation, up 81.5 percent from 2013. There are “just not enough organs to go around,” said Ashish Shah, chief of cardiac surgery at Vanderbilt University. The kidney numbers are even bleaker. Over 500,000 people are on dialysis in the US, but only a fraction will ever reach the waiting list, and even among those who do, many will die before receiving a transplant offer, said Dorry Segev, a transplant surgeon and researcher at NYU Langone.

The modern DCD boom grew out of this desperation, presenting the possibility of donation in far more common cases of death that transplantation surgeons had rarely been able to draw on before: catastrophic strokes, car crashes, cardiac arrests, and other injuries that left patients with no meaningful chance of recovery but short of brain death. But with DCD, the clock suddenly became a factor. Once circulation stopped, the organs deteriorated fast, and, in many cases, they were ruined before surgeons could recover them. 

Because of those challenges, DCD stayed marginal for decades, at well under a tenth of all donations. Those numbers ultimately spiked because of several things that happened almost simultaneously.

The first was technological. New machines, like TransMedics’ Organ Care Systems — which were first used in 2015 in the UK — could keep a recovered organ alive outside the body, pumping it with warm, oxygenated blood instead of packing it in ice, allowing a heart to beat and function as normal inside a box. This meant that even if there was delay in recovering an organ, that damage could be limited, even reversed, once the organ was put in the machine. 

Other teams found ways to use machines originally developed to support failing hearts and lungs to restart circulation inside the bodies of donors after death had been declared. Transplant teams in Spain and the UK began adapting that technology before American programs picked it up for DCD hearts around 2019. Both approaches helped extend the time to successfully perform DCD.

“As soon as the results were good, the big American centers took it on,” said John Dimarakis, a cardiac transplant surgeon at the University of Washington.

Policy changes also helped push DCD further. In Hoffman’s case, the donation process was coordinated by CORE, the nonprofit responsible for organ donation in the Pittsburgh region. Organ procurement organizations, or OPOs, cover a particular region in the US, and they work with hospitals in that region to evaluate potential donors, speak with families, arrange testing, and offer organs to transplant centers. There are 54 such OPOs in the US, which are certified and regulated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 

For years, critics argued that OPOs were judged according to weakly defined standards based on numbers they reported themselves, and poor performers were rarely penalized. But in 2020, new federal rules began ranking them against one another, with a mechanism to strip the worst performers of their territory. Facing the threat of losing their monopolies, many OPOs began pursuing harder cases they would’ve earlier passed over, according to Greg Segal, who founded patient advocacy group Organize. A larger share of those more complicated donors were DCD.

Still, no single force explains the speed of DCD’s rise. “Technology plays a big role in it,” said Nader Moazami, a cardiac surgeon at NYU Langone who helped pioneer one of the new techniques. “But it doesn’t explain how suddenly 50 percent of our donors are DCD.” In 2000, there were only 118 DCD donors in the United States. By 2025, there were 8,137. Brain death donation grew over that same period but far more slowly — from 5,867 donors a year to 8,416.

↗ Explore the interactive version of this chart.

Whatever the mix, it’s clear that DCD has led to more organs, shorter waits, and saved thousands of lives that otherwise would have ended on a list. “People who have been waiting now wait less,” Dimarakis said.

On a chart, it looks like an unambiguous triumph — until you step into a hospital room.

The passage

Beth Hoffman remembers her sister Emily’s last morning. She read aloud an email from Bradley Whitford, Emily’s favorite actor from the TV drama The West Wing, who had written after hearing what had happened. Then, a playlist of Emily’s favorite songs played as the breathing tube came out. Within about 10 minutes, while “For Good” from Wicked filled the room, her sister was gone.

What Beth mostly didn’t see was the second sequence unfolding around her: the referrals, tests, calls, and scheduling that would turn Emily from a dying patient into an organ donor. 

Federal rules require every hospital to alert their organ procurement organization whenever a person may be nearing death. The OPO screens those referrals, and most go nowhere. Alexandra Glazier, who runs the OPO that covers most of New England, says hers get about 50,000 such referrals a year. Only 2 or 3 percent turn out to have any medical possibility of donation at all. 

Emily was one such possible case for her Pittsburgh hospital’s OPO. The organization had to reach out to her family; explain what DCD would involve; and, then, start the work that had to happen while she was still alive: reviewing her medical history, testing whether her organs could be used, matching them to recipients, and arranging the surgical teams who might fly in to recover them.

Most families never see much of that work, but some do. Smith, the UCSF neurologist, watched a family agree to withdraw life support and donate, set a time, and gather relatives for a final goodbye, only to learn that the withdrawal had to wait because the OPO still needed more tests. Some families, after being told their dying relative must stay on machines longer for donation’s sake, walk away.

For the Hoffmans, things proceeded more quietly. When the time came, Emily was wheeled into the operating room, and the breathing tube was removed there. The surgeons who would recover her organs were kept away from the withdrawal and death declaration. They often fly in from their own hospitals — sometimes several at once for different organs — but they’re walled off from everything that comes before. “We are not involved in that process,” said Dimarakis, the cardiac transplant surgeon at the University of Washington, “because it’s not ethical for us to be involved.”

That separation is the line DCD depends on. One team cares for the dying patient, withdraws support, and declares death. The other waits outside that decision and recovers the organs only after. The OPO stands between them, coordinating the donation without letting the firewall be breached.

Then comes the waiting. Once the ventilator is out, the clock starts ticking. If the heart doesn’t stop within a window — often about two hours — the organ recovery may be called off, and the patient is returned to end-of-life care. But when circulation does stop, as it did for Emily, the team counts exactly five more minutes to make sure it won’t restart on its own. Only then can a hospital physician declare death, and only then can the transplant surgeons begin.

DCD rests on a simple promise: The need for organs never causes the death. The death is already coming, and donation only changes what can come from it. 

But a new frontier in DCD complicates that promise.

The reversal

Normally, after death is declared, most DCD organs are removed and preserved outside the body, either on ice or on machines that circulate oxygenated fluid or blood. The goal is to slow the damage that begins the moment circulation stops.

Then, around the mid-2010s, transplant teams in Spain and the UK began using a newer technique that restores circulation inside the dead donor’s body, before the organs are removed. It’s called normothermic regional perfusion, or NRP.

In one version of NRP, called abdominal NRP, blood is meant to be restored only below the diaphragm to preserve organs such as the kidneys and liver. In a more controversial version called thoracoabdominal NRP, it runs through the chest, as well, and the heart starts beating again.

For the transplant team, especially heart surgeons, the appeal is clear. Kidneys and livers can survive a stretch without circulation, but a heart is harder to preserve. Once it has stopped, there’s no easy way to know whether it will beat reliably again. NRP helps answer that question by restarting it inside the donor’s body after death has been declared, where surgeons can watch it work before deciding whether to recover it.

Shah, the Vanderbilt cardiac surgeon, says the technique lets doctors take hearts from donors who otherwise would not be able to yield a workable one.

But this kind of NRP is unsettling for the very reason that it is useful. If a death is declared because the heart has stopped, what does it mean to start it again inside a donor’s body, often only minutes later? Is that still death? Or something else?

The controversy isn’t simply that the heart beats again. A beating heart is not, by itself, the same as a living person. The heart of a brain-dead patient can beat, too, can be kept going by machines, and that doesn’t mean the person is alive. The deeper concern is whether restored circulation in the body could reach the brain, which could potentially restore consciousness.

To prevent blood from reaching the brain, surgeons clamp or cut the vessels that carry blood to the head before circulation is restored. That distinction is central to the defense of NRP, and it lets surgeons say they are restoring circulation and restarting the heart, not the person. 

But those safeguards haven’t always worked. In a safety notice last November, the Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network (OPTN), the federal system that oversees transplant policy and data, said it had received “verified reports” that blood had unintentionally reached the brain and brainstem during NRP. Such events are extremely rare, the notice said, but can occur when a clamp fails or blood reaches the head through an unrecognized route. The notice asked transplant programs using either form of NRP to strengthen their safeguards and report any failures. But those recommendations were not national requirements and as of May 2026, the OPTN was still developing formal standards for NRP. For Claire Morgan, a transplant surgeon from North Carolina who has criticized NRP’s rollout, that is a central weakness. “It’s a bulletin. It’s not a policy,” she said. “There’s no punishment for not reporting.”

But even if blood never reaches the brain, NRP can still introduce deeper ambiguity into our understanding of circulatory death. In the first few minutes after a heart stops, it can often be brought back, an event that happens every day in a busy emergency department. In conventional DCD, however, doctors don’t try to restart the heart, because a patient or family has already decided against being revived. It is that decision, not just the stopped heart itself, that turns the moment into a death. The same goes for anyone who dies under a do-not-resuscitate order.

NRP puts pressure on that logic. The circulation declared permanently gone is deliberately brought back. “There’s a misalignment between NRP practices and the legal standard for how death is defined,” said Glazier. You cannot, critics argue, pronounce someone dead because the circulation will never return — and then return it.

Robert Truog, professor of Medical Ethics, Anaesthesia, & Pediatrics at Harvard Medical School, supports NRP but thinks the possibility of blood returning to the brain is the issue that matters most. “The only questions are, is there a risk of pain or suffering in the procurement of the organs?” he said. And there’s a possibility of that if the circulation is restarted in the brain.

None of this is settled, which is why some hospitals refuse to perform NRP at all. Moazami pioneered the NRP heart technique in the US and practices it at NYU Langone. “But you cannot do it at Columbia,” he said, “just five miles away.” Glazier’s OPO, one of the country’s largest, said her organization has done roughly 650 NRP cases since adopting the practice — but only the abdominal kind, holding off on the heart version until the national protocols are better standardized.

Claire Morgan, a transplant surgeon from North Carolina who has criticized the rollout of NRP, is more worried about what happens if something goes wrong. The donor cannot complain, families may never know if there was a concern, and clinicians who speak up may have limited protection if they challenge what happened in the operating room. 

All of that matters, because NRP is already far from marginal. The Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network (OPTN), the federal system that oversees transplant policy and data, only began collecting data on whether NRP was used in a DCD recovery in October 2025. In the first five months of that reporting, from October 1, 2025, through February 28, 2026, 3,463 DCD donors were recovered nationally, according to data shared by the OPTN with Vox. More than half of those involved NRP; though, OPTN doesn’t collect data on which kind.

Vox’s analysis also found that NRP cases were concentrated among some organ procurement organizations. The top 10 OPOs accounted for 47 percent of all DCD recoveries that used NRP.

The patchwork

The core safeguard in DCD — that the decision to withdraw life support must come before questions about donation — is widely accepted. But many of the details around that sequence that shape a family’s experience, or a patient’s protection, are still handled differently from hospital to hospital, OPO to OPO.

“The entire process of DCD or donor withdrawal is not very standardized across the United States or even within states, even within different hospitals in the same city,” Moazami said.

That can mean differences in what families are told about the donation process, what medications are considered appropriate before death, whether NRP is allowed and how it is performed, and who has the clear authority to pause or stop the process if someone believes something is wrong.

That unevenness matters more now, because the transplant system has been trying, with good reason, to recover more organs. For years, many in the field, and those who depended on it, argued that the organ procurement organizations were leaving transplantable organs on the table. Greg Segal, whose advocacy group Organize helped push for stronger OPO accountability, compared the old system to a canvassing campaign where you only knock on the easiest doors. “The problem with OPOs is they were only doing the much easier ones,” he said.

A 2020 rule from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the federal agency that oversees OPOs, was meant to change that. It ranked OPOs against one another and created a path to penalize low performers by stripping them of their territories. That policy appears to have had some impact, but it is hard to separate from other forces driving DCD’s rise including new preservation technology, like NRP and broader clinical adoption. Jeffrey Trageser and Charles Strom from the Association of Organ Procurement Organizations, the trade group that represents OPOs, argued that the metrics are too broad, evaluating OPOs partly on whether transplant centers ultimately accept organs and not fully accounting for regional differences such as age of potential donors, local rates of cancer, or how far organs must travel to reach transplant centers.

This pressure to recover more organs has also made some OPOs seem more aggressive to the clinicians working besides them. “Some people view them as vultures, which is horrible,” said Smith, the UCSF neurologist who has experienced the tension from the hospital side. “They’re trying to do their job.” Still, he added, “when you impose that [pressure], then it changes how aggressive they are.”

Both things can be true. The old system needed pressure to perform better. And pressure can create risks, or perceived risks, in a process that depends on careful judgement around a dying patient.

And the safety question isn’t a theoretical concern either. A March 2025 investigation from the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), the federal agency that oversees the national transplant system, documented what can happen when those safeguards fail. In a review of attempted DCD cases at Kentucky Organ Donor Affiliates, an OPO that covered Kentucky and parts of Ohio and West Virginia, HRSA found recurring problems about staff missing vital signs in patients that raised concerns, failed to work collaboratively with hospital medical teams, failed to respect family decision-making, and documented medical data poorly. HRSA said the pattern suggested “organizational dysfunction” and a weak safety culture.

One OPO’s failure does not prove that DCD is broadly unsafe or that OPOs across the country behave the same way. But the Kentucky review showed how badly things can go when the line between patient care and organ recovery is not honored.

Since then, federal officials have been trying to close some of the gaps. HRSA has pushed for clearer family education around DCD and more standardized reporting on ventilated patients referred to OPOs, as well as opened up a reporting channel that sends misconduct concerns directly to HRSA. In a separate case, the Department of Health and Human Services also moved to shut down an OPO in South Florida after finding unsafe practices, underperformance, and paperwork errors.

Organ donation is a touchy subject, because it relies so much on the goodwill and the trust of the people who agree to give their organs so they can live on in others. But the procedural issues also matter, because there are lives at stake on both sides of the process. 

Around 13 people die each day in the US waiting for organs. In that desperate landscape, the rise in DCD has led to many lives saved and helped several more live better, fuller lives. The dearth of organs even compelled my former Future Perfect colleague Dylan Matthews to sign up as a living donor and donate his kidney to a complete stranger. (You can read his story here).

And the value of the donation is not just measured in recipients saved. For the Hoffmans, the knowledge that Emily’s organs helped others offered a solace they had not expected. Emily “gave the gift of life in her death,” Beth told me.

That is the highest ideal organ donation — and DCD – can achieve: a death already coming that still changes the lives of others in need. The case for DCD is clear, but its future depends on its proponents’ ability to protect both patients and public trust.

Clarification, July 1, 6 pm ET: A previous version of this post described how the NRP process intends to stop blood from reaching the brain, but did not acknowledge cases where that does not go according to plan. The post has been updated to include a safety notice from the Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, which said it had received “verified reports” that blood had unintentionally reached the brain and brainstem during NRP. The post has also been updated to clarify that Dorry Segev and Nader Moazami are doctors at NYU Langone. 

There was an unintentionally revealing moment in acting Attorney General Todd Blanche’s confirmation hearing last week. After Sen. John Kennedy (R-LA) asked Blanche whether he and President Donald Trump are friends, the leader of the United States Department of Justice replied, “I’m his lawyer,” before correcting himself and saying he “was his lawyer.”

Blanche previously defended Trump in three criminal cases brought while the president was out of office, but he is emphatically not supposed to be Trump’s lawyer right now. As acting attorney general — Blanche currently leads the DOJ because the attorney general’s job is vacant and Blanche is the Senate-confirmed deputy attorney general (DAG) — Blanche’s client is the United States, not the person who happens to occupy the White House. 

But it’s easy to see why he misspoke: Blanche has largely acted as Trump’s hammer since he was confirmed as the DOJ’s No. 2 official, overseeing numerous prosecutions of Trump’s perceived enemies. Now Trump wants to promote him to the DOJ’s top job — a sign of Trump’s confidence in his former criminal defense lawyer turned personal enforcer.

It’s unusual for a president to put his own defense lawyer in such a powerful position — indeed, it’s unusual for a president to have a criminal defense lawyer at all. But Trump has a long string of attorneys who’ve defended him and his companies against an equally long string of criminal allegations ranging from tax fraud, to falsifying business records, to illegally taking classified documents, to charges arising from his failed attempt to steal the 2020 presidential election. 

And he’s put at least five of those criminal defense lawyers in top federal jobs. 

Trump’s decision to turn much of his criminal legal team into powerful government officials matters for two big reasons. The first is that two members of that team, Blanche and Solicitor General John Sauer, are leaders within the Justice Department. Next to the military, there is no more fearsome government institution than the DOJ, which has the power to arrest people and try them for federal crimes. 

The DOJ is supposed to exercise this authority with restraint — and often with restraints imposed by the Constitution itself — but Blanche has used the Justice Department’s power against Trump’s political enemies who appear to have committed no crime and removed constraints on Trump and his Justice Department, all while Sauer has worked consistently to convince the Supreme Court to remove other constraints on Trump.

Meanwhile, three of Trump’s former criminal lawyers, Emil Bove, Justin Smith, and Matthew Schwartz, now have lifetime appointments as US Court of Appeals judges, placing them one rung on the judicial ladder down from the Supreme Court. The judiciary, of course, is the branch of government that is supposed to prevent the president from breaking the law, so every Trump loyalist appointed to this branch weakens the remaining legal constraints on Trump and his administration.

Trump, of course, isn’t the only president to place close confidants in the Justice Department or the federal bench. President John F. Kennedy famously named his brother attorney general. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Abe Fortas, who represented him in a 1948 election dispute, to the Supreme Court in 1965.

But Trump’s decision to place someone willing to pursue his personal vendettas in charge of the Justice Department is, at the very least, a break with post-Watergate norms established to prevent the DOJ from becoming a political weapon. And Fortas, who resigned in disgrace after fewer than four years on the bench, is more of a cautionary tale than a model of good governance.

Although the current Supreme Court is dominated by conservative Republicans, some of these justices do break with Trump on questions that divide the Republican Party — such as whether Trump should unilaterally impose high tariffs on many nations. But if Trump gets to turn his personal cronies into justices, that could change quickly. A judiciary controlled by MAGA loyalists means that all remaining checks on Trump’s authority could end. Many of his former-lawyers-turned-appointees are already working to make an unchecked Trump administration a reality.

How are Trump’s former personal lawyers already reshaping American legal norms?

Smith, who worked on the Trump v. United States immunity case, was confirmed last month. And Schwartz, who worked on the false documents case that led to Trump’s conviction, joined the bench last week. So there’s not much to say about these two men’s record in federal office — yet.

But Blanche, Bove, and Sauer have all displayed ruthless cunning in their efforts to advance Trump and his causes.

Blanche has been DAG since March 2025, a role that oversees the federal government’s criminal prosecutions and its 93 regional US attorneys’ offices. He’s led the entire Justice Department since April, after former Attorney General Pam Bondi — another of Trump’s former personal lawyers — left office.

So Blanche oversaw several dubious federal prosecutions targeting people Trump perceives as enemies, including criminal proceedings targeting former FBI Director James Comey and current New York Attorney General Letitia James. There’s also evidence that Blanche has played an unusually direct role in the Justice Department’s decision to bring meritless charges against prominent Democrats.

In May 2025, for example, Newark Mayor Ras Baraka, a Democrat, showed up at an ICE detention facility in his New Jersey city and asked to tour it. He was briefly let inside the gate, where he was confronted by about a dozen law enforcement officers and asked to leave, which he did.

But then one of these officers received a phone call. A video, later submitted to a federal court, shows the officer turning to his colleagues after the call and announcing, “We are arresting the mayor right now, per the deputy attorney general of the United States.” That deputy attorney general, of course, was Blanche. (In a September court filing, DOJ confirmed that officers arrested Baraka “after consulting with the Deputy Attorney General.”)

Yet, despite Blanche’s apparent decision to personally order Baraka’s arrest, the DAG forgot to check whether Baraka had actually done something that could support criminal charges. The mayor was only charged with misdemeanor trespassing, and those charges were dismissed two weeks later. At the court hearing formally dropping these charges, a federal magistrate judge admonished prosecutors for “using the immense power of the government to pursue weak cases or to make examples without sufficient cause.”

Blanche also unsuccessfully attempted to establish Trump’s $1.776 billion “anti-weaponization fund,” which would have been used to distribute money to Trump’s allies — including, potentially, Trump supporters who participated in the January 6 attack on the US Capitol. Although the fund appears dead after it received bipartisan pushback in Congress, a DOJ press release announcing the fund said it was “established” by the attorney general, a role performed by Blanche, and that the fund would be administered by five people chosen by Blanche.

Before Trump took office, Bove was Blanche’s law partner. Shortly before Bove joined the bench, he briefly served as principal associate deputy attorney general — essentially the DAG’s top deputy, which meant that Bove was Blanche’s right-hand man. In that role, he was often described as Trump’s “enforcer.” 

Bove spent only about half a year as Blanche’s lieutenant, but he managed to spark a mini-revolt in one of the Justice Department’s most prestigious offices during his short tenure. After Bove ordered the DOJ to dismiss corruption charges against then-New York City Mayor Eric Adams “without prejudice,” a maneuver that would allow the charges to be reinstated if Adams did not cooperate with the Trump administration’s immigration crackdown, seven federal prosecutors resigned rather than comply with Bove’s order. 

One was Danielle Sassoon, a former law clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia, a conservative icon. Another, Hagan Scotten, wrote in his resignation letter to Bove that “I expect you will eventually find someone who is enough of a fool, or enough of a coward, to file your motion. But it was never going to be me.” Scotten clerked for Republican Chief Justice John Roberts and for future Republican Justice Brett Kavanaugh.

Meanwhile, a whistleblower complaint by another former DOJ lawyer claims that Bove said, in a meeting about a court decision halting some deportations, “that D.O.J. would need to consider telling the courts ‘fuck you’ and ignore any such order.”

Trump appointed Bove to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit last September. Federal appeals courts typically spend months deciding cases, so his tenure on the Third Circuit has thus far been less eventful than his time at the DOJ. But there are early signs that he remains loyal to Trump even after moving into an independent branch of government. Bove attended a Trump rally in December, a highly unusual move for judges who are supposed to remain nonpartisan. And the background image on his iPhone is reportedly an image of a defiant Trump raising a fist, or at least it was months after he joined the bench.

That leaves Sauer, who, as solicitor general, is tasked with defending federal government programs in the Supreme Court. That includes the Trump tariffs that the Supreme Court struck down last winter, and Trump’s unconstitutional attempt to strip many newborn Americans of their citizenship.

Despite these losses, Sauer has an impressive winning record before the Supreme Court, largely because the Court is controlled by six Republicans who are highly sympathetic to Trump and his agenda. This is, after all, the same Court that said that Trump may use the powers of the presidency to commit crimes, after Sauer argued as much. 

Sauer has been particularly effective in persuading the Republican justices to block lower court rulings against Trump on the Court’s “shadow docket,” a once rarely used mix of emergency motions and other matters that became a routine part of Supreme Court litigation during Trump’s first term.

So Trump has taken several of his personal lawyers and transformed them into some of the most well-credentialed — and in some cases, the most powerful — figures in the legal profession. Thus far, the evidence suggests that these individuals remain loyal to Trump, even when they move into jobs that are supposed to be nonpartisan. Three of them already have lifetime appointments. 

Any nation governed by the rule of law must have government officials who will obey whatever constraints the law imposes — whether they be federal agency leaders who follow the law out of a sense of duty, or judges who rein in executive branch leaders who refuse to do so. Institutions like the Department of Justice also depend on informal norms, many of which are a response to similar abuses of power during the Nixon administration, that have long constrained federal prosecutors.

But Trump’s DOJ is often actively hostile to these norms, and the growing legal power of Trump’s personal lawyers is just the latest example. Their steady reshaping of the judiciary clears the way for a federal government that is not constrained by anything.

In January 2025, Linda-Gail Bekker stood inside a vaccine manufacturing plant and allowed herself to believe that the first HIV vaccine candidate conceived through African science and led by Africans might finally become a reality.

The vaccine would be built on mRNA technology, the same platform that had helped tame the Covid-19 pandemic. Bekker hoped it might finally crack the puzzle that had frustrated HIV researchers for more than four decades.

No virus has proved more evasive. Hundreds of HIV vaccines have entered testing; none has succeeded at providing durable protection against infection. And the need remains vast: In 2025, roughly 1.2 million new HIV infections were reported; anti-retroviral treatments have turned it into more of a survivable disease, but more than half a million people died from AIDS-related causes the same year. There is still no known cure.

So researchers like Bekker, an infectious disease specialist at the University of Cape Town, have more hope now, in part because there is finally a clearer idea of what an effective vaccine needs to do. It must coax the immune system into producing a particular type of protective antibody, a rare class of defender, capable of recognizing and disabling HIV despite the virus’s extraordinary diversity and rapid ability to mutate.

No one yet knows how to reliably do that. But mRNA is uniquely suited to the task of finding out, vaccinologists say. Thanks to the platform’s speed and flexibility, researchers can iterate rapidly through the otherwise laborious process of designing, testing, and refining the series of vaccine components needed to guide the body toward making those essential antibodies.

At the start of last year, Bekker and her colleagues were ready to put that strategy to the test. The clinical trial for their new mRNA-based HIV vaccine was just on the verge of enrolling its first participants. But the project depended on the same backing that had sustained HIV vaccine research for decades: US government funding. Washington had long supplied roughly 90 percent of the world’s investment in the field. Then President Donald Trump returned to office.

Within hours of his inauguration, Trump signed an executive order freezing foreign aid. The $45 million contract from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) that was supposed to fund clinical trials like Bekker’s disappeared, as did a web of other funds, many routed through the National Institutes of Health (NIH), that had helped fuel the field’s progress for years.

The timing could hardly be more cruel. After 40-odd years of chasing a shape-shifting foe, scientists believe they now know what kind of immune response an HIV vaccine must generate — and have in mRNA a powerful new tool for pursuing it. But just as many researchers have finally glimpsed a path to victory, the United States and much of the funding has pulled away from the fight. 

Pushing the envelope

From the outset, the target for preventing HIV was clear. Within a year of identifying the virus as the cause of AIDS in 1983, researchers had zeroed in on its envelope protein as the most promising point of attack for a vaccine.

Protruding from the virus’s surface in knobby clusters, the envelope protein acts like a molecular grappling hook, latching onto immune cells before pulling the virus itself inside. Without this feature, HIV cannot infect a cell.

Much as the coronavirus spike protein would later become the basis for Covid vaccines, this protein on the surface of HIV seemed an obvious bullseye. But identifying the target didn’t mean researchers could hit it. Most of what the immune system sees of the envelope protein is actually just a decoy. The parts that stick out and draw the strongest immune response are also its most changeable, differing from one strain to the next and mutating freely whenever antibodies close in, leaving the body to waste its firepower on a target that keeps slipping away.

Candidate vaccines kept making the same mistake. They would elicit plenty of antibodies, but not the kind that could keep up with the virus. Time and again, promising candidate vaccines generated excitement in the laboratory, only to come up empty when it mattered most in large-scale clinical testing.

The field’s fortunes started to change in the late 2000s when researchers began studying the small fraction of people living with HIV who developed antibodies capable of recognizing the virus’s concealed, conserved features. Though these hard-won antibodies came too late to protect their makers, they gave scientists a molecular blueprint for the defenses a vaccine would need to build.

As the field came to learn, these “broadly neutralizing antibodies” do not appear overnight but rather after years of battle with the virus. 

The challenge, then, was to design a vaccine that would not just trigger an immune response but guide a person’s immune system through the same evolutionary journey. This would require a succession of vaccine components to prompt a carefully choreographed process within the body, rather than the single, fixed target that suffices for shots against measles or hepatitis B.

It was a strategy rooted in rational design but dependent on trial and error. Progress would come through a steady stream of small proof-of-concept studies, each informing the next generation of vaccine candidates. Ordinarily, it would take at least a year — often longer — to manufacture and prepare each vaccine iteration before it could be tested in people. 

But then the Covid pandemic rocketed mRNA into the spotlight.

The mRNA advantage

mRNA technology upends the old recipe of vaccine development. Conventional shots work by showing the immune system a mugshot of the enemy: a killed or weakened germ, or one of its proteins, grown batch by batch in vats of cells or eggs. An mRNA vaccine takes a different route. Rather than supplying the mugshot, it supplies the instructions to draw one: a short, lab-printed strip of messenger RNA, the molecule cells normally use to ferry genetic directions from DNA to their protein-making machinery.

Inject the right sequence, and it will program the body’s own cells to become tiny factories, producing the target protein and presenting it to the immune system as if it were the real intruder. Because it is all just code, refining a design means editing text, not rebuilding a factory — the work of days, not months.

“We’ve been able to design vaccines in real time,” said University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine assistant professor Ted Kreider, who is a specialist in infectious diseases.

To HIV researchers, the appeal was obvious. HIV’s greatest weapon was its ability to shift and adapt. Now, at last, a vaccine could, too. 

The timing was ideal. Just as researchers were beginning to map the path to an effective vaccine, mRNA offered a way to move down that path at speed. With vaccine designs no longer bottlenecked by design and manufacturing, what once might have taken decades of stepwise vaccine development could, thanks to mRNA, be compressed into years.

Across a growing number of clinical trials, researchers are now testing different vaccine components, different sequences, and different delivery platforms, searching for the combination that most effectively nudges the immune system toward a truly HIV-thwarting response.

A paper published last month in Nature offered one such path forward, showing in monkeys that a painstaking sequence of eight shots could coax the immune system into producing potent antibodies capable of neutralizing a broad range of HIV strains. But even the study’s authors see a catch. “It’s still too many [shots] to be practical in humans,” said Dennis Burton, a professor of immunology and microbiology at Scripps Research who worked on the project.

Whether mRNA ultimately becomes the vaccine itself — or simply the tool that helps researchers discover it — remains an open question.

The fundamental challenge for now, after all, is vaccine design, notes Mark Feinberg, president and CEO of IAVI, a nonprofit research organization focused on developing vaccines against HIV. And for that task, he says, “the most obvious advantage of mRNA is simply the speed of getting an idea from the laboratory to the clinic.”

But if the technology reaches the finish line, researchers say it could offer other advantages as well. Because the protein is made inside the body’s own cells rather than in a lab, it folds and displays itself much as it would on the real virus, giving the immune system a more faithful target to train against. That way, when the real virus arrives, the body already knows its true face.

It also gives vaccine designers an unusual number of knobs to turn, notes Kristie Bloom, an mRNA vaccine researcher and molecular biologist at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa. By altering the vaccine’s formulation, dose, or genetic design, researchers can shape not just the magnitude of the immune response but also its balance: favoring antibody-producing B cells, virus-killing T cells, or some mix of the two.

With mRNA, “there’s quite a bit of flexibility,” she said.

Not so fast

For all the putative upsides, however, mRNA does carry some baggage. There are concerns about public acceptance given the intense backlash and misinformation campaigns that followed the rollout of Covid-19 vaccines. And though those shots ultimately proved remarkably safe, with very low rates of serious side effects, a peculiar skin problem has emerged in early-stage trials of mRNA vaccine candidates for HIV specifically. 

In two separate trials reported last year, around one in 12 participants who received mRNA-based HIV vaccines manufactured by Moderna developed chronic urticaria, a form of persistent hives that in some cases endured for years. The vaccines encoded different portions of HIV’s envelope protein, yet both produced the same unexpected side effect.

The fact that the reactions appeared across distinct vaccine designs — but never before in Moderna’s other mRNA vaccine programs — has fueled suspicion that something about HIV’s envelope protein itself may be involved. Even so, no clear explanation has emerged. 

“We’ve ruled a bunch of things out,” said William Schief, a professor at Scripps Research’s department of immunology and microbiology who doubles as vice president for protein design at Moderna, “but there’s no smoking gun.”

Schief is continuing to investigate the source of the immune reactions. But not wanting an unresolved safety signal to bring the program to a halt, he and his collaborators have pressed ahead with lower-dose versions of the vaccine, betting that the hives will fade while the desired immune response remains intact. 

That strategy is now being evaluated in an IAVI-backed trial led by Bekker in South Africa. Known as IAVI G004, it has yielded encouraging early results. (Unlike the African-developed vaccine whose launch was derailed by the USAID funding freeze, this study is testing a different mRNA vaccine candidate, manufactured by Moderna.)

At the lowest dose tested, just one-tenth of the amount used in the original studies, the hives that had troubled earlier trials never materialized, Bekker said. Her team has since moved on to a somewhat higher dose, seeking the sweet spot between safety and immune potency. 

All of these discoveries and challenges along the way have helped map a path forward. “We know what we need to do,” said Barton Haynes, director of the Human Vaccine Institute at the Duke University School of Medicine. The task for them now is to move through the necessary iterations as quickly as the science — and the funding and political landscape — allow.

“A black hole”

When Bekker and her team learned about the sudden funding cut that would halt their African-designed, USAID-funded vaccine study in January 2025, they were already in Tanzania to prepare its launch. They immediately had to stop work on the project, which had been years in the making. “It was like falling into a black hole of depression,” she said. 

And the setbacks kept coming. With prominent vaccine critic Robert F. Kennedy Jr. overseeing US health policy, the federal government moved to undermine both vaccine science broadly and mRNA technology in particular.

The NIH, in addition to terminating dozens of smaller HIV-related grants, began winding down its flagship Consortia for HIV/AIDS Vaccine Development (CHAVD) program, which has long served as a cornerstone of global HIV vaccine research, while other federal agencies curtailed support for mRNA vaccine projects across multiple disease areas.

At the same time, South Africa, the continent’s leading center for biomedical research, found itself in the Trump administration’s crosshairs over allegations of anti-white discrimination. New federal research grants were no longer permitted to support collaborations with South African scientists, severing ties that had underpinned years of international HIV research.

“That’s a perfect storm to prevent us from building on the most exciting science HIV vaccines have had in 45 years,” said Mitchell Warren, executive director of AVAC, a nonprofit dedicated to HIV prevention access and policy. 

Yet for all the financial and political disruption, the scientific momentum hasn’t stopped. Philanthropic organizations and governments elsewhere have stepped up to help fill the funding gap, allowing key trials to move forward, although in scaled-down forms with more modest ambitions. 

The Africa-led effort that Bekker had dreamed of was salvaged, with emergency backing from the South African Medical Research Council, albeit in diminished form and built, in the end, on the same protein-based technology that mRNA was meant to leapfrog.

The only mRNA-based HIV vaccine study that is actually underway in Africa is IAVI G004: a program designed by US scientists, not by locals, and funded largely by the Gates Foundation.

A longtime backer of HIV research, that foundation is estimated to invest around $70 million annually — with $64 million being invested in 2022, and $70 million in 2026 — across a global portfolio of HIV vaccine programs. That’s a substantial sum, though only a fraction of the hundreds of millions of dollars once provided by the NIH, USAID, and other federal agencies. 

For now, some of that funding continues to flow. But even what remains is far from assured. The Trump administration’s proposed 2026 budget would slash the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases — the NIH institute that has long anchored HIV vaccine science — along with the Office of AIDS Research that coordinates HIV research across the entire NIH, leaving the field’s longer-term future in doubt.

“We’re not going to be able to fill the gap that’s been left by the US government,” said Nina Russell, director of TB & HIV research and development at the Gates Foundation. Still, she says, the foundation remains determined to keep the most promising vaccine programs moving forward: “We are super committed to it.”

All of these changes have left the research field daunted, but not hopeless. “It’s been a very disruptive time,” said Burton, who leads one of the CHAVD research hubs. But he remains convinced the field is on the right track. “The pieces of the puzzle are in place,” he said. “It’s obviously been a long, long journey, but you can begin to see the end.”

A higher bar

The funding crisis and political challenges are not the only forces reshaping HIV vaccine development.

For much of the HIV epidemic, which has killed over 40 million people worldwide, even a partially effective vaccine might have been enough to transform the course of HIV. Today, however, vaccine researchers are also competing against long-acting preventive drugs that can protect people for months at a time with just two injections. 

These drugs are an enormous step forward for HIV protection, but they also raise the standard the vaccine field must meet, Warren said. “The bar for a licensed vaccine that is going to have a public health impact has gotten much higher,” he said.

But these prophylactic drugs, which began as daily pills and have evolved into long-acting injectables, are only as good as the systems that deliver them. Cost, stigma, and the need for regular clinic visits have limited access in many countries with the highest HIV burdens. A vaccine, by contrast, that provided years of protection after a handful of doses could overcome many of those barriers.

That is precisely why many scientists view the current retreat of the US government with such alarm. After decades of disappointments and billions of dollars in investment, the field finally believes it has a coherent strategy for building an effective HIV vaccine. The fear is that momentum could stall just as researchers have begun to see a path across the finish line. As a result, what once seemed like a scientific problem increasingly looks like a political one.

For Bekker, the current moment feels all too familiar. In the early 2000s, South Africa’s government embraced AIDS denialism, delaying the rollout of lifesaving treatments and forcing researchers and clinicians to battle both the virus and the state. A quarter-century later, she says, the political opponent has merely changed address to Washington, DC, threatening once again to undermine the fight against HIV and cost countless lives.

“When politics interferes in science,” Bekker said, “that is the death of scientific progress.”

Bekker still does not know whether the vaccine she watched being manufactured last year will ever reach the people it was designed to protect. She and her colleagues still hope to carry out the made-in-Africa mRNA vaccine trial they spent years designing — if they can find a way to pay for it. But Bekker remains convinced that the scientific strategy behind it is the right one, and that mRNA may yet do for HIV what it did for Covid-19, rapidly transforming decades of scientific groundwork into an effective shot.

She only hopes politics does not succeed where HIV itself has failed in slowing the field’s progress. “We should only be fighting the virus,” Bekker said. “But we’re fighting the administration and its policies, and that is a waste of our energy.”

The Democratic Socialists of America say they are fighting for “a government by, for, and of the working class.” 

Yet the organization’s membership and candidates consist largely of educated professionals. As of 2021, 80 percent of DSA members over 25 were college-educated, while 28 percent earned more than $100,000 a year (putting them in roughly the top 15 percent of America’s income distribution), according to a DSA internal survey. Among the group’s most prominent politicians, meanwhile, is an Ivy League graduate student, a lawyer, and the well-educated son of a Hollywood director and famous academic. 

In recent weeks, as the DSA has racked up victories in Democratic primary elections, the apparent tension between the group’s self-conception and demographics has attracted critical scrutiny.

In the New York Times, Thomas Edsall argues that most of the DSA’s members and supporters in the electorate are “in no way working class.” The libertarian commentator Robby Soave, right-wing pundit Batya Ungar-Sargon, and liberal economics writer Noah Smith have all voiced similar sentiments. 

There are many cogent ways for socialists to respond to such criticism. One would be to note that an organization doesn’t need to have a uniformly working-class membership in order to fight for working-class interests. Another would be to observe that not all college graduates are well-heeled professionals, even as pundits often use educational attainment as a stand-in for class in political analysis. 

But some socialists prefer a simpler retort: The DSA’s critics are simply mistaken; in reality, the group’s membership is more or less entirely “working class” — because that term describes everyone who must sell their labor in order to meet their needs. 

This conception of the “working class” has deep roots on the left. As Jacobin’s Ben Burgis explains, orthodox socialists subscribe to a “two-class map of capitalist society,” in which “Some people are capitalists who own their own ‘means of production’ (like factories, farms, offices, or grocery stores) and other people work for the capitalists.”

Many contemporary socialists (including Burgis) find this dichotomy reductive, and endorse more nuanced portraits of America’s class structure. But the orthodox, “two-class” model informs a great deal of the modern left’s rhetoric, among both socialists and progressives. And the notion that lawyers and day laborers both belong to the “working class” is widely held among anti-capitalists. 

There’s something to be said for this idea. Educated professionals and manual workers surely do have some shared interests, due to their common status as laborers. For example, both benefit from the existence of a well-funded unemployment insurance system, in a way that the Elon Musks of the world do not. 

For the most part though, orthodox socialism’s “map” is badly out of date. And its expansive conception of “the working class” does less to illuminate modern America’s economic divisions than to obscure them.  

The long afterlife of Marx’s failed prophesies

Karl Marx and Frederich Engels laid the foundations for the modern left’s conception of class in The Communist Manifesto of 1848. 

In that book, the claim that there were just two important classes under capitalism — capitalists and workers — rested on a set of grim predictions about where industrialization was headed. 

According to Marx’s analysis, technological progress was in the process of obliterating “all distinctions” between different strata of working people, as automation was driving virtually everyone’s wages down to “the same low level.” The middle class of small manufacturers and shopkeepers, meanwhile, was poised to “decay and finally disappear,” as more productive, large-scale enterprises left them in the dust.

Society was therefore splitting into “two great hostile camps” — the capitalist and working classes, whose interests were impossible to reconcile. 

Under these conditions, a binary conception of class makes perfect sense. If all workers will soon be condemned to low wages, then there’s little point in dwelling on the (temporary) distinctions between them. Likewise, if shopkeepers and small-time capitalists have gone the way of the triceratops, one can more comfortably cast all business owners as members of the ruling elite.

You can’t navigate modern capitalism with a 19th-century map

But we don’t live in the future that Marx foresaw. 

Rather than melting all workers into a uniform proletariat, capitalism cultivated a kaleidoscopically diverse laborforce — one segmented by countless fine-grained distinctions of pay and prestige. And instead of immiserating ordinary people, industrial development brought unprecedented mass prosperity (albeit, with the aid of many socialistic reforms). 

As a result, old-school socialists’ “two-class map” makes for a poor guide to modern capitalism’s terrain. And anyone trying to impose Marx’s cartography onto the landscape will encounter several problems.

For one, in a world where some workers earn as much in a year as others do in a lifetime, the idea that there is only one fundamental class division — that between laborers and capitalists — becomes unconvincing. 

In the United States, some convenience store owners make $70,000 a year, while many surgeons earn upward of $600,000. It would be odd to say that the former are members of society’s dominant class (since they live off business income), while the latter belong to its subordinate one (since they live off salaries). After all, the minimart owner and Musk do not have especially similar material interests. Nor, for that matter, do the impoverished farmworker and high-earning neurosurgeon (much less, the superstar athlete with a $40 million salary). Yet this is what orthodox socialism’s binary would suggest. 

Ultimately, in a modern capitalist society, it makes a lot more sense to see class as a multidimensional continuum than as a binary.

A second, related difficulty is that the border between labor and capital has grown fuzzier since Marx’s time. Today, American workers often own both a home and some share of their nation’s financial assets, like a 401(k) filled with stock from major corporations. Many billionaires, meanwhile, choose to work. 

Socialists are well aware of this reality, which is why they define a person’s class status by their dependence on labor: The typical white-collar worker may own a little stock, but not enough to quit her job and live off dividends. Unlike a billionaire CEO, such a professional must work in order to meet her needs. 

This is a sound distinction. But it does not actually resolve the challenge of distinguishing the working class from the ruling one. This is because, in an advanced economy, whether someone “needs” to work is partly subjective. Millions of Americans survive on less than $25,000 a year in market income. If upper-middle-class families were willing to accept a similarly austere living standard, many would be able to live entirely off their investments.

Of course, Americans shouldn’t be content to live in poverty. But it is harder to say precisely what standard of living qualifies as “enough.” In Marx’s time, a relatively good life for a wage worker might have meant reliable access to food and shelter for one’s family and a little time and money left for simple leisure. Today, the list includes high-quality education for one’s children, access to advanced medical treatments, modern home appliances for cooking and cleaning, Internet-connected devices for entertainment, and often personal transportation, like a car — all of which are typically (and justifiably) treated as basic necessities.

This raises the question: At what level of wealth does a person stop needing to work — even if they must keep clocking in to achieve their desired lifestyle? The socialist writer Matt Bruenig has proposed drawing the line at about $1.4 million (or roughly 20 times America’s average wage): Once you’ve accrued that much in housing and financial assets, your decision to sell your labor becomes voluntary and you cease to be working-class. 

This is a reasonable cut-off. But it’s still fairly arbitrary. Ask an American with a net worth of $1.4 million whether they need to work, and they’re liable to say yes. And typically, they will be correct — at least, in the sense that they could not sustain their way of life without earning a paycheck. You could say that their present lifestyle is too lavish — and that $1.4 million in assets is all that’s required to generate the amount of income one truly needs. But it’s not obvious why this threshold doesn’t actually lie at $1.6 million, or $800,000, or $500,000.

As a result, the only way to draw the upper boundary on who “needs” to work — without making arbitrary judgments about what standard of living is necessary — is to place it extremely far up the class hierarchy: The superrich generally don’t need to choose between sustaining their lifestyles and abstaining from work. But once your definition of “working class” becomes capacious enough to include low-end multimillionaires, it loses all plausibility. 

Ultimately, in a modern capitalist society, it makes a lot more sense to see class as a multidimensional continuum than as a binary. An individual’s degree of economic freedom and power is determined by a host of factors — above all, their household incomes and net worths, but also the market value of their skills (which shapes their future earning prospects) and familial wealth and connections. Even one’s eligibility for social welfare benefits can matter; after all, the largest group of Americans who don’t need to work to meet their needs are Social Security recipients.

Precisely how we should weigh these different sources of advantage is a tricky question. And implicit disagreements over it shapes our discourse about “the working class.” 

Take Graham Platner, the former Democratic Senate candidate in Maine. To his champions, Platner was a working-class candidate, due to his lack of a college diploma, years of service in the military, and low-income, physically demanding job farming oysters (along with his gravelly voice and tattoos). To his detractors, meanwhile, Platner was a pseudo-proletarian due to his upper-middle-class childhood, prep school education, and receipt of steady financial help from his father and mother, a lawyer and entrepreneur. Meanwhile, Platner probably would not qualify as “working class” under the orthodox socialist definition for multiple reasons: For one, he does not need to work in order to get by, thanks to his disability benefits and family support. For another, he is the owner of his oyster business, rather than a salaried worker who answers to a boss. 

In any event, whichever factors one emphasizes, it’s clear that a person’s class privilege increases continuously as their income, net worth, familial wealth, and “human capital” rises. There is no single point on any of these scales past which a person’s class position is abruptly transformed. The gap between “the 99 percent” and the billionaire class matters — but so does that between the top 15 percent and the working poor.

Of course, in ordinary political discourse, we inevitably need to boil down reality’s intricacies into rough categories. No politician will ever promise to fight for the “bottom six deciles in combined SES score, nor will any labor activists ever chant, “The 30th to 60th percentiles in household income, united, will never be defeated.” 

But a taxonomy of classes with several subcategories (such as “the poor,” “the working class,” “the middle class,” “the upper-middle class,” “the rich,” and “the superrich”) will capture a bit more of reality than a taxonomy with only two. 

“Working-class” rhetoric can camouflage professional-class interests

All this said, even if orthodox socialism’s “two-class map” is analytically flawed, it could still be politically beneficial. Perhaps, when affluent professionals decide that they belong to the same class as the working poor, they become more inclined to fight for the latter’s interests. 

Some of the DSA’s own activities lend credence to this theory: Despite its largely white-collar membership, the organization advocates for many policies that would principally benefit America’s most disadvantaged. More broadly, in the wake of Occupy Wall Street, many college-educated millennials came to identify with “the 99 percent.” And as this cohort has grown more influential in Blue America, the Democratic Party has embraced more ambitious anti-poverty policies, such as a guaranteed monthly income for working-class families. 

The main fiscal barrier to American social democracy is that our middle class in general — and upper middle-class in particular — pays much lower taxes than their peers in Western Europe.

And yet, socialists’ expansive conception of “the working class” can be put to more dubious uses. Specifically, it can help relatively well-off professionals disguise their class’s particular interests as those of all working people.  

The left’s push to cancel all graduate student debt is arguably a case in point. During Joe Biden’s presidency, the DSA criticized the White House for attempting to forgive only $10,000 of most borrowers’ student loans (a plan that was ultimately blocked by the Supreme Court). Instead, the socialists called on Biden to cancel all student debt, including the balances accrued by the graduates of elite medical schools and MBA programs. 

On its face, the idea that the US government should transfer tens of thousands of dollars to young doctors and Harvard MBAs would seem wildly regressive. The median US physician can expect to earn more than $6.5 million over the course of their lifetime, while the median graduate of a top-five business school can expect to earn more than $8 million. Virtually all Americans have worse prospects than this. And in the inflationary conditions of the Biden era, increasing young professionals’ disposable income was liable to push up prices for everyone else. In other words, blanket student debt forgiveness would have likely transferred purchasing power from low-income workers to early-career physicians and management consultants.

Many socialists would struggle to defend such a policy, were it presented in these terms. But by eliding the class distinctions between low- and high-income borrowers,  the DSA was able to convince itself (if not the public) that across-the-board forgiveness was in the interest of “the working class.”

The socialist framework is similarly unhelpful in the realm of tax policy. 

In recent years, as socialist and progressive politicians have grown more dependent on professional class support, they’ve become more averse to endorsing broad-based tax increases.

From Zohran Mamdani to Chris Van Hollen, the Democratic left tends to reserve its tax hike proposals for the superrich. And yet, the reason that America lacks a comprehensive welfare state is not that our billionaires pay unusually little in taxes; to the contrary, our top rates are comparable to those of some Scandinavian countries. The main fiscal barrier to American social democracy is that our middle class in general — and upper middle-class in particular — pays much lower taxes than their peers in Western Europe. Simply maintaining our existing programs, like Social Security, will likely require a major tax increase on higher-end salaried workers. 

In this context, binary conceptions of America’s class structure — which pit an undifferentiated “working class” against the capitalist elite, or the 99 percent against the 1 percent — can help educated professionals evade responsibility for bankrolling a more egalitarian economic system.

Check your class privilege

Ultimately, the DSA’s ability to serve working-class interests hinges less on its own demographics than its policies and politics. When an organization mistakes the preferences of its most privileged members for those of all working people, however, its campaigning and policymaking is liable to suffer. 

Perhaps, before this century’s end, AI will bring about the calamity that Marx prophesied — and Ivy League lawyers and delivery drivers will find their skills equally devalued by an all-powerful ownership class. Until the robot apocalypse, however, educated professionals and low-wage workers will live in very different circumstances — and harbor distinct economic interests. To safeguard the wellbeing of the disadvantaged, well-off egalitarians need to mind these gaps, not paper over them with obsolete class categories.